Caught in the Wheels of Power by Kurban, Dilek & Sozeri, Ceren
Caught in the Wheels of Power: 
The Political, Legal and Economic Constraints on  
Independent Media and Freedom of the Press in Turkey
DEMOCRATIZATION 
PROGRAM
TESEV DEMOCRATIZATION Program  Medıa studıes serıes - 3
Authors
Dilek Kurban
Ceren Sözeri
4
Caught in the Wheels of Power: 
The Political, Legal and Economic Constraints on  
Independent Media and Freedom of the Press in Turkey
Authors:
Dilek Kurban
Ceren Sözeri
Caught in the wheels of power: 
The Political, Legal and Economic Constraints on Independent 
Media and Freedom of the Press in Turkey
TESEV PUBLICATIONS
ISBN 978-????
Copyright © June 2012
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced electronically or mechanically (photocopy, 
storage of records or information, etc.) without the permission of the Turkish Economic and Social Studies 
Foundation (TESEV).
The viewpoints in this report belong to the authors, and they may not necessarily concur partially or wholly 
with TESEV’s viewpoints as a foundation.
TESEV would like to extend its thanks to the Open Society Foundation, and the TESEV High Advisory Board 
for their contributions with regard to the publication and promotion of this report.
Bankalar Cad. Minerva Han  
No: 2 Kat: 3  
Karaköy 34420, İstanbul
Tel: +90 212 292 89 03 PBX
Fax: +90 212 292 90 46
info@tesev.org.tr
www.tesev.org.tr
Türkiye Ekonomik ve
Sosyal Etüdler Vakf›
Turkish Economic and
Social Studies Foundation
Demokratikleşme Program›
Democratization Program
Author:
Dilek Kurban 
Ceren Sözeri
  
Prepared for Publication by:
???
  
Translation:
????
Publication Identity Design: Rauf Kösemen, Myra
Cover Design: Banu Yılmaz Ocak, Myra
Page Layout: Gülderen Rençber Erbaş, Myra
Coordination: Sibel Doğan, Myra
Production Coordination: Nergis Korkmaz, Myra
Printing Organization: Artpres Matbaacılık San. Tic. Ltd. Şti 
Printed by: Scala Basım, Yayım, Tanıtım San. ve Tic. Ltd. Şti.
Yeşilce Mah. Girne Cad. Dalgıç Sk. No:3
4.Levent/İstanbul-Türkiye  Tel: 0212 2816200 pbx 
Copies: 500
Case Study Report
Updated and Expanded Version
Does media policy promote 
media freedom and independence? 
The case of Turkey 
Dilek Kurban
Ceren Sözeri
June 2012
4MEDIADEM, özgür ve bağımsız medyayı güçlendiren veya tam tersine engelleyen faktörleri 
anlamayı ve açıklamayı amaçlayan bir Avrupa araştırma projesidir. Proje Belçika, Bulgaristan, 
Hırvatistan, Danimarka, Estonya, Finlandiya, Almanya, Yunanistan, İtalya, Romanya, Slovakya, 
İspanya, Türkiye ve İngiltere’de ülke bazında yapılan araştırmaları medya sektörleri ve çeşitli 
türlerdeki medya servisleri açısından karşılaştırmalı bir bakış açısıyla analiz ederek bir araya 
getirmektedir. Proje kapsamında, adı geçen ülkelerdeki medya politikalarının yapılanışının 
araştırılmakta ve yeni medya araçlarının medya özgürlüğü ve bağımsızlığı açısından sağladıkları 
imkanlar ve yarattıkları zorluklar incelenmektedir. Bunun yanı sıra, Avrupa Birliği ve Avrupa 
Konseyi’nin devletin medya politikalarını tasarlanması ve uygulaması sürecinde yaptıkları dış 
baskılar da proje kapsamında derinlemesine tartışılıp analiz edilmektedir. 
Proje Başlığı:  Avrupa Medya Politikalarına Yeniden Bakmak: Günümüz Demokratik 
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TESEV’s Presentation
own media, and many habits from social manipulation 
to voluntary censorship became the common trait of 
the whole sector.
Today, it is seen that the Turkish media faces the 
problem of pressure from the state and from govern-
ments, as much as it faces problems stemming from 
its own capital structures and ideological choices.. 
What’s more, this situation is taking place in a country 
that still cannot put democratic laws in place and that 
maintains a notion of law that is foreign to the 
freedom of expression and of media.  
 The democratization of the media is vital in terms of 
creating an independent and civilian supervision on 
politics and bureaucracy and ensuring that social 
demands find their voice in the public domain... And 
this requires a change in the legal framework and in 
the ownership structure, as well as actually function-
ing rules of competition. Yet at the same time, a 
transformation in the mentality of the media in 
parallel with the domain of politics is also necessary...
This report is the third of a series of publications that 
TESEV has released within its Media and Democracy 
research area. Building upon the earlier reports and a 
comprehensive field work, this third report situates 
media freedom and independence in Turkey within a 
historical context and offers a critical analysis of the 
role played by political actors, regulatory agencies, 
media owners, courts and journalists in the infringe-
ment of journalistic freedom in Turkey. We hope that 
the report will offer a meaningful contribution in 
triggering a discussion on the domain of media, which 
is one of the main building blocks that will ensure 
Turkey’s democratization...  
The depiction of the media as the fourth estate by the 
theory of democracy makes a reference to an idealized 
societal system. While this situation reflects a limited 
reality even in Western countries, it is almost entirely 
unrealistic in Turkey since the tutelary regime set up 
and systematized by the Republic has made relations 
with the army vital for the media and positioned the 
press as a conveyor of the official ideology and 
national issues. 
This situation also gained an identity-based meaning 
within the community structure reinforced by the 
Republic. To the extent that it acted as the voice of the 
“centre” defined by the state, the media also repre-
sented the identity-related aspect of this centre. 
Hence, there was born a media world that otherized 
those who were outside the centre, and that gained 
privileges and concessions by advocating laicism and 
the Turkish ethnic identity.
Using the political power to take advantage of cyclical 
opportunities resulted in the media evolving towards 
an oligopolistic structure while gaining a denomina-
tional character, and at the same time expanding 
towards the other areas of the economy where it 
created monopolist advantages. 
Hence, media organs started to see themselves as 
political actors that could bargain with the govern-
ment, an approach that rapidly corrupted the sector. 
On the other hand, with the broadening of the area of 
politics within the last two decades, a diversification 
and pluralisation was experienced in the media. 
Unfortunately, this situation did not imply a transfor-
mation in the mentalities or a pluralist perspective. 
On the contrary, each community started to have their 
Etyen Mahçupyan, TESEV Democratization Program
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Executive Summary 
completely wiped out of the market, while others 
were seized by the state transferred. Shortly after the 
Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma 
Partisi- AK Parti) came to power in 2002, the main-
stream media was reconfigured ideologically as either 
‘opponent’ or ‘proponent’ to the government.
Notwithstanding the limited positive effects of the EU 
accession process on media freedom, there are dozens 
of ECtHR judgments regarding freedom of expression 
and freedom of the press waiting to be executed by 
the Turkish state. Journalists who are powerless 
vis-à-vis the owners and political power are particu-
larly affected by the political polarisation in the media. 
The structural obstacles to unionization and the lack 
of solidarity in the profession lead to labour exploita-
tion, low quality content and violations of media 
ethics.
The lack of a strong pro-democracy social movement; 
the ideological conservatism of the judiciary; the 
institutional weakness of the parliament; and the lack 
of democracy within political parties render the 
government – and future governments – too powerful 
vis-à-vis the society and the media. On a positive note, 
however, there is a growing awareness on the need for 
social monitoring of the media. In the absence of a 
widely accepted and established self-regulatory 
framework, various nongovernmental organizations 
and activist groups started to watch the media in 
order to expand the culture of diversity and to reduce 
discrimination, racism and hate speech. 
Media policy in Turkey has shaped the media-state 
relationship since the establishment of the first 
newspaper in the late Ottoman period. While 
regulations were often employed as an effective 
disciplinary tool against the press in processes of 
state formation and modernization, opponent 
journalists have constantly been suppressed by state 
and non-state actors who claimed to act in the name 
of ‘state interests.’ 
The coup d’état in 1980 and the concomitant economic 
liberalisation changed the ownership structure of the 
media sector with the entry of new investors. Follow-
ing the abolishment of state monopoly on broadcast-
ing in the 1990s, big conglomerates expanding 
through vertical and horizontal mergers have 
dominated all fields of the media. The high concen-
trated market structure in the media was made 
possible due to the inadequacy of legal barriers to 
cross-mergers, as well as the lack of measures that 
would prevent media conglomerates from participat-
ing in public tenders in other sectors of the economy. 
The shortcomings of the regulatory framework to 
promote press freedom and diversity in the media has 
encouraged big corporations to regard themselves as 
legitimate political actors that can bargain with the 
government.
Media ownership was restructured following the 
economic crisis in 2001. Big media groups, which had 
investments in the financial and banking sectors, 
were particularly affected by the crisis; some being 
1. Introduction 
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1. Introduction 
can explain why and under which circumstances an 
independent and free media fails to emerge in a given 
country. This report is an attempt to understand the 
legal, political and economic constraints on media 
freedom and independence in Turkey through a 
historical lens for a critical analysis of the state-media 
relations. 
The report aims to analyze and explain the actors and 
processes of media policy making in Turkey; the 
substance and implementation of such policies; the 
legal framework governing media content; the 
ownership structure of the media; the working 
conditions of journalists; self-regulation for ethical 
issues and self-censorship; and the emerging social 
efforts to combat discrimination and hate speech in 
the media. Part two of this report focuses on the 
actors and values that affect the making of media 
policies, highlighting the significant role of big 
corporations in shaping structural regulation and 
competition. In part three, the structure of the media 
market and the conducts of big players are examined 
from the perspective of democracy and diversity. 
Since the major problems facing the media in Turkey 
stem from the legal system, Part four discusses the 
‘mentality’ that shapes content regulation as a 
significant obstacle to journalistic freedoms. The 
vulnerable position of journalists vis-à-vis media 
owners and the political power is also the result of a 
lack of horizontal solidarity in the profession. In Part 
The media in Turkey has been in the limelight in recent 
years. Though historically the media has never been 
immune to the influence of political power and 
internal ideological polarization, the sharp divisions 
and extreme politicization of the Turkish media over 
the last decade is unprecedented. The media once 
again proved to be a critical actor at a time when the 
country was undergoing a historic process of political 
and social transition, and was acutely divided along 
the rift between the military and the government. The 
side various media organs chose to align with in this 
conflict is not simply a matter of political preference; 
it is a reflection of the deep social, economic and 
political transition taking place in the country since 
the early 1980s. The consecutive and at times 
simultaneous processes of economic liberalisation, 
globalization and democratization produced various 
outcomes for the media sector, which has undergone a 
significant structural, technological and ideological 
change itself. On the other hand, the current state of 
affairs in the media and its interdependent relation-
ship with the state cannot solely be explained by the 
developments of the past three decades. The political 
economy and ownership structure of the media, the 
vulnerability of journalists vis-à-vis their bosses and 
the absence of a motive for an independent media in 
pursuit of the truth can only be explained and 
understood with a due account of the historical 
origins of the media in Turkey. 
Research on media independence and freedom of 
press in any country, and particularly Turkey, requires 
more than an analysis of the regulatory framework. It 
is the political and ideological factors that lie behind 
the anti-democratic and repressive laws, rather than 
the content and implementation of these laws that 
This report is an attempt to understand the media 
freedom and independence in Turkey through a critical 
analysis of the state-media relations. 
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five, the working conditions of journalists, journalistic 
standards and practices are reviewed. Finally, Part six 
looks at media literacy in Turkey. Considering the high 
access rate of television (98 per cent) and long 
watching hours, the media literacy education initiated 
in primary education deserves close scrutiny. Both the 
content and the teaching methodology of this class 
raise serious issues. Taking into account that media 
literacy is not only a matter of education, but also a 
political and ideological issue, this part discusses the 
opportunities created by campaigns of advocacy 
groups.
The report is based on a review of the relevant 
literature, legal research and discussions with the 
main media actors in Turkey. Six closed workshops1 
were organised as part of the fieldwork, bringing 
together a total of 41 individuals from public and 
private media who are directly or indirectly concerned 
with media freedom and independence in Turkey. 
Additionally, we conducted one-on-one interviews 
with media professionals, journalists, representatives 
of regulatory agencies and policy makers. 
1 Workshops organized: ‘Media and democratisation’ 
(Istanbul, 8/10/2010); ‘Human resources problems and 
the future of the media sector’ (Ankara, 18/12/2010); 
‘Labour relations and working conditions in the media 
sector’ (Ankara, 21/12/2010); ‘The new legislation on the 
structure and authority of the Radio and Television 
Supreme Council’ (Istanbul, 11/3/2011); ‘Investment and 
competition media sector relations: the present and the 
future of the sector’ (Istanbul, 21/4/2011); and ‘Media and 
regulatory high bodies: The status of legal and 
governance regulations’ (Ankara, 18/10/ 2011).
2. Media Policy Making in Turkey: 
Actors, Values, Processes 
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2. Media Policy Making in Turkey: 
Actors, Values, Processes 
Televizyon Üst Kurulu-RTÜK) for ‘regulating and 
inspecting the activities of radio and televisions.’4 The 
policymakers’ main concern in adopting the law was 
to control the content of private audio-visual compa-
nies and to make sure that they complied with rules 
and regulations. In the past decade, the principal 
trigger behind policymaking in the media has been the 
need to harmonize the laws with the EU’s acquis. The 
most recent example of this phenomenon was the 
adoption of a new broadcasting law in accordance 
with the EU’s Audiovisual Media Services Directive 
(hereon referred to as the Directive or the EU Direc-
tive) in 2011. The consideration of the commercial 
needs of private broadcasters amidst rapid techno-
logical improvements was also influential in the 
adoption of the law. 
The politically nationalist and culturally conservative 
values endorsed in the constitutional and legal 
framework have diffused into the media policy making 
process. Relevant ministries, agencies and institu-
tions responsible for media regulation strictly adhere 
to these principles, while at the same time paying lip 
service to freedom of expression, freedom of the press 
and the right to privacy. Where the inherent tension 
between these goals comes to surface, policy makers 
make a clear choice on the side of the protection of 
the family, nation and the state over the individual. 
4 Constitution Art. 133. 
Turkey did not have a regulatory framework governing 
media content until the mid 1990s, owing to the 
domination of the state in all sectors of the economy, 
including the media. Until mid 1980s, the state had 
direct control over the media. In 1983, the coming to 
power of the neoliberal Motherland Party (Anavatan 
Partisi-ANAP) following the end of the military rule 
marked a turning point in Turkey’s economy. ANAP’s 
leader Turgut Özal initiated a process of economic 
liberalization and adopted free-market reforms. The 
new government’s support for private entrepreneur-
ship encouraged big corporations to enter the media 
sector. Despite a constitutional ban on private 
broadcasting, Turkey’s first private television station, 
Magic Box, was launched in 1990 via satellite from 
Europe. This resulted in the entry into the market of 
various other private broadcasters; radio and television 
stations were launched one after another in blatant 
disregard of the constitution (Elmas and Kurban, 2010).  
The legal chaos ensuing from the rapid deregulation of 
the media and the ‘emergence of cartels due to the 
low number of actors which entered the sector’ gave 
rise to the need for a regulatory framework to govern 
the market.2 This resulted in the adoption of the first 
broadcasting law, no. 3984,3 and the establishment of 
the Radio and Television Supreme Council (Radyo ve 
2 Erol Katırcıoğlu, professor of economics at Istanbul Bilgi 
University, minutes of the workshop on the topic of  
‘Media and regulatory high bodies: The status of legal and 
governance regulations’, Ankara, 18/10/2011.
3 Radyo ve Televizyonların Kuruluş ve Yayınları Hakkında 
Kanun [Law on the Establishment of Radio and Television 
Enterprises and their Broadcasts], no. 3984, Official 
Gazette no. 21911, 20 April 1994. The law was repealed 
with the adoption of the new Broadcasting Law, no. 6112, 
on 15 February 2011.
The politically nationalist and culturally conservative 
values endorsed in the legal framework have diffused into 
the media policy making process.
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As in all other areas, policy making in the media in Tur-
key is a centralized and bureaucratic process where 
values and priorities are set by the executive. Until 
mid-2011, the principal executive organ in charge of 
the media was a Ministry of the State. An executive 
decree adopted on 17 August 2011, however, now 
authorizes the Ministry of the EU Affairs to monitor 
and inspect the activities and transactions of autono-
mous regulatory agencies – including those in charge 
of media regulation.5 While the implications of this 
change remain to be seen, the shift in authority ‘is 
perceived as an intervention to the autonomy of these 
agencies’6 and a ‘strategic policy change on the part of 
the government.’7 
Again, generally speaking, the parliament has a very 
limited role in policy making in the media. In accor-
dance with strict party discipline which dominates the 
political culture in Turkey, parliamentarians very often 
vote in line with party politics. Little discussion on 
substantive issues takes place in the parliament and, 
to the extent that it does, it remains extremely 
partisan. Opposition parties often express their 
opinions through accusations rather than constructive 
criticism whereas the government rarely takes into 
account their feedback. The reactive political culture 
5 Avrupa Birliği Bakanlığının Teşkilat ve Görevleri hakkında 
Kanun Hükmünde Kararname ile Bazı Kanun ve Kanun 
Hükmünde Kararnamelerde Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair 
Kanun Hükmünde Kararname [Decree with Force of Law 
Concerning Amendments to the Decree with Force of Law 
Concerning the Organization and Powers of the Ministry 
of European Union Affairs and to Certain Laws and 
Decrees Having the Force of Law] no. 649, Official Gazette, 
no. 28028, 17 August 2011, Article 45.
6 An official at a media regulatory agency, minutes of the 
workshop on the topic of ‘media and regulatory high 
bodies: The status of legal and governance regulations’ , 
Ankara, 18/10/2011.
7 Katırcıoğlu, ‘Media and regulatory high bodies: The 
status of legal and governance regulations’ Workshop.
of lawmaking and the legislative workload caused by 
the need to harmonize the national legal framework 
with the EU’s acquis communautaire prevent the 
parliament from timely responding to the unforeseen 
needs arising from the rapidly changing media sector.8 
The parliament’s minimal role in lawmaking has been 
further restricted by the Justice and Development 
Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi- AK Party) govern-
ment’s recent strategy to make legislative amend-
ments through executive decrees adopted by the 
cabinet, as opposed to laws enacted by the parlia-
ment. The most recent example of this strategy in the 
media is the adoption of the executive decree no. 649 
mentioned above. During the policy making process, 
the government rarely consults civil society working 
on the media, and where it does, the input collected is 
often not reflected in the policy output.9 The regula-
tory agencies’ role in policy making is also quite 
limited; they are tasked with preparing drafts in accor-
dance with the political priorities of the government, 
which then finalizes these before submission to the 
parliament.10
The independence and impartiality of bureaucratic 
regulatory agencies have been contested all along in 
Turkey: ‘The political branch replaces and reaffirms 
itself through these authorities.’11  Undoubtedly, the 
agency whose impartiality and autonomy have been 
most fiercely contested is RTÜK. Tasked with 
allocating licences and permits for terrestrial, satellite 
and cable broadcasting; supervising broadcasting 
content; responding to audience complaints; and 
8 An official at a media regulatory agency, ‘Media and 
regulatory high bodies: The status of legal and 
governance regulations’ Workshop.  
9 Özden Cankaya, professor of communications, 
Galatasaray University, minutes of the workshop on the 
topic of ‘the new legislation on the structure and 
authority of the Radio and Television Supreme Council’ 
Istanbul, 11/03/2011. 
10 An official at a media regulatory agency, minutes of the 
workshop on the topic of ‘the new legislation on the 
structure and authority of the Radio and Television 
Supreme Council’ Istanbul, 11/03/2011.
11 Katırcıoğlu,  ‘Media and regulatory high bodies: The 
status of legal and governance regulations’ Workshop.
As in all other areas, policy making in the media in Turkey 
is a centralized and bureaucratic process where values and 
priorities are set by the executive.
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Other relevant authoritative bodies include the 
Information and Communication Technologies 
Authority (Bilgi Teknolojileri ve İletişim Kurumu-BTK), 
which is tasked with the supervision and sanctioning 
of the internet. It enjoys administrative and financial 
autonomy. The parliament does not have a role in the 
process of the selection of its (seven) members, who 
are appointed by the cabinet. The parliament also 
lacks powers to oversee the agency, which reports 
solely to the government. The Telecommunications 
Communication Presidency (Telekomünikasyon İletişim 
Başkanlığı-TİB) is a part of BTK. It was founded 
pursuant to a 2005 amendment in the Police Law15 for 
the specific purpose of law enforcement in the 
telecommunications sector. Among the members of 
the agency are the representatives of the National 
Intelligence Agency, the Directorate General of the 
Police and the Gendarmerie Central Command. 
Tasked with the centralized administration of 
telecommunication wiretapping in Turkey, TİB is 
required to share the information it gathers with the 
intelligence, the police and the gendarmerie and, 
upon request, with the courts and prosecutors. 
The Competition Authority (Rekabet Kurumu) is an 
autonomous regulatory body tasked with enforcing 
competition rules in all sectors of the economy, 
including the media. The authority’s broad mandate 
and the high number of complaints it receives from all 
sectors create a heavy workload. As of April 2011, the 
Authority has been able to examine only 10 per cent of 
the applications it has received. According to the 
officials of the Authority, this situation confirms the 
need for developing specific competition rules for the
15 Bazı Kanunlarda Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Kanun [Law 
on the Amendment of Certain Laws], no. 5397, 3 July 2005, 
Official Gazette no. 25884, 23 July 2005, Art. 1.
imposing sanctions in cases of non-compliance, 
RTÜK’s mandate extends to both radios and televi-
sions. The decisions of the agency are open to judicial 
review. 
Though defined in the constitution and its founding 
law as an autonomous public legal entity, RTÜK lacks 
the mandate to develop its own principles and the 
power to regulate.12 Instead, it is expected to operate 
within the substantive boundaries drawn by the 
parliament and its powers are limited to sanctioning 
the media (as discussed in section 4.1.). The agency’s 
efforts to introduce new norms can be prevented by 
courts, even if it is in the name of protecting rights 
and freedoms and furthering public interest. A recent 
example was RTÜK’s failed attempt to sanction 
broadcasts displaying violence against animals. 
Though both the law and the agency’s executive 
regulation prohibit broadcasts encouraging harmful 
actions against animals,13 the sanctions it attempted 
to impose against a broadcaster were stayed by a 
court on the ground that the law did not grant the 
agency such powers.14 On the other hand, as we 
discuss in greater detail later in the report, RTÜK does 
not always adopt a similar rights-based approach 
when exercising its sanctioning powers. 
RTÜK’s independence has been a matter of conten-
tion for a long time due to its political composition. 
The agency has nine members elected by the parlia-
ment for a period of six years from a pool of candi-
dates nominated by political parties. The number of 
nominees proposed by each party is dependent on the 
number of members it has at the parliament. 
12 An official at a media regulatory agency, ‘Media and 
regulatory high bodies: The status of legal and 
governance regulations’ Worskhop. 
13 Yayın Hizmeti Usul ve Esasları Hakkında Yönetmelik 
[Regulation on the Principles and Substance of 
Broadcasting Services], Official Gazette no. 28103, 2 
November 2011, Art. 8(l).
14 An official at a media regulatory agency, ‘Media and 
regulatory high bodies: The status of legal and 
governance regulations’ Workshop.
RTÜK’s independence has been a matter of contention for 
a long time due to its political composition. 
22
 media and more effective supervision  
mechanisms.16
The Directorate General of Press Advertisement (Basın 
İlan Kurumu-BİK) is tasked with allocating official 
advertisements and announcements to the print 
media. The legitimacy, function, and lack of autonomy 
of the agency have been contested issues ever since it 
was founded. The fact that BİK has the powers to 
prohibit advertisements to any publication it deems 
to have violated media ethics as a sanction can create 
a censorship effect due to the state-dependent 
structure of the agency. Nevertheless, in recent years, 
BİK has allocated a significant portion of its activities 
to strengthening the local press. It has come to an 
agreement with RTÜK on using the 3 per cent contri-
bution the latter collects from television channels to 
strengthen the local media. This has been evaluated 
as a positive development in terms of the promotion 
of the local media, the better representation of 
geographical diversity of society and the improvement 
of the quality of local journalism. 
16 An official at the Competition Authority, minutes of the 
workshop on the topic of ‘investment and competition 
relations in the media sector: the present and the future 
of the sector’, Istanbul, 21/04/2011.
3. The Structure of Turkish Media Market 
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3. The Structure of Turkish Media Market 
for business interests, the media competes with the 
government for political power and profit, rather than 
perform its watchdog function. 
3.1  MEDIA OWNERSHIP: THE LEGAL 
AND POLITICAL FRAMEWORK  
There are no legal restrictions on ownership of the 
press in Turkey. The print sector is subject only to a 
registration procedure prescribed by Article 3 of the 
Press Law, whereby the outlet is required to provide 
basic information about its printing facilities to the 
office of the local Chief Prosecutor. 
Broadcasting companies, on the other hand, are 
subject to licensing requirement pursuant to Article 26 
of the constitution on the grounds that they use scarce 
or finite resources, i.e. frequencies. The allocation of 
such frequencies, however, has never been completed 
in Turkey. In 1995, RTÜK halted the process in the 
name of developing frequency planning first. The 
agency announced that it would not be accepting any 
new licence applications from television enterprises 
after 28 April 1995 and from radio enterprises after 8 
December 1995 (Atabek, 1999). Tenders for frequency 
allocations were scheduled to begin in 1997. At the 
time, Turkey was going through a major political 
turbulence owing to the escalating conflict between 
the military and the Islamist Welfare Party (Refah 
Partisi), the junior partner of the coalition government. 
During the National Security Council meeting on 28 
Since the launch of the first newspaper in the Otto-
man Empire to the industrialisation of the press in the 
1960s, journalism in Turkey has been led by a small 
group of journalists or journalist families who have 
also had a leading role in the social and political 
processes of change during the foundation of the 
republic. The liberalisation in the 1980s catalyzed the 
entry of other actors into the sector and changed the 
profile of investors (owners) of the media. In the 1990s, 
with the termination of state monopoly over broad-
casting, the Turkish media market started to be 
dominated by a few conglomerates, which increased 
their economic power through vertical and horizontal 
mergers, and pursued competition strategies by 
setting up cartels and engaging in promotion wars. 
This situation changed considerably with the 2001 eco-
nomic crisis and the ensuing state regulation of the 
banking sector. Those media groups which had 
investments in the financial and banking sectors were 
particularly affected by the crisis; some of them were 
completely wiped out while others were seized by the 
Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (Tasarruf Mevduatı 
Sigorta Fonu-TMSF) established by the government.
The high concentrated market structure in the media 
has been due to the inadequacy of legal barriers to 
cross-mergers, as well as the investments of the 
media owners in other sectors. Today, that ‘media is 
used as a weapon by the groups for their non-media 
investments’ is a widely accepted opinion in Turkey 
(Sönmez, 2003; Bek, 2004; Adaklı, 2006). Almost all 
big media groups have investments in the energy, 
telecommunications, financial or construction sectors 
among others. There are no barriers for preventing 
these groups from participating to public tenders 
either. Consequently, while public interest is sacrificed 
Almost all big media groups have investments in various 
sectors of the economy. There are no barriers for preventing 
these groups from participating to public tenders.
26
February 1997, the generals forced the government to 
resign. Soon after, extreme ‘security measures’ were 
introduced against Islamist organizations and media.17 
Among these measures was the requirement for media 
owners and executives to get a national security 
clearance18 in order to prevent ‘separatist and reac-
tionary’ broadcasts (Önderoğlu, 2005). As a result of 
the ensuing bureaucratic chaos, the Prime Ministry 
halted the frequency planning process. 
In 2001, RTÜK decided to resume the tenders, starting 
with national television enterprises, yet the Council of 
State (Danıştay) issued a decision to stay. In the 
meantime, in 2002, a new law was adopted (no. 4756), 
transferring the task of frequency planning to the 
Telecommunications Authority (Telekomünikasyon 
Kurumu) (Kılıç, 2002). However, to this date, the agency 
has not completed the planning process. In addition to 
the public broadcaster TRT, there are 23 national, 16 
regional and 212 local television channels broadcasting 
with temporary licences currently in Turkey. 
The predicament regarding the allocation of frequencies 
has created a barrier by increasing the cost of entry to 
the market. This, in turn, has been a major obstacle to 
diversity and pluralism in the broadcasting media. 
Partially to solve this problem, the new Broadcasting 
17 This period has since been commonly referred to as ‘the 
February 28th process.’
18 The lawsuit filed on the grounds that this certificate, 
issued by the Prime Ministry, hinders freedom of the 
media, was decided by the 13th Chamber of the Council of 
State in 2005. The court upheld the amendment on 
grounds of national security, national interests, public 
interest and rectification of legal shortcomings, and did 
not find an infringement upon freedom of the media.
Law (no. 6112) reassigned the task of frequency planning 
to RTÜK. Article 26 (4) requires a sorting tender to be 
held for private radio and television enterprises: ‘media 
service provider enterprises that have been established 
as radio and television broadcasting companies and 
have operated in the field of radio and television 
broadcasting for at least one year, that fulfil the 
prerequisites specified in the tender specifications and 
that have obtained a qualification certificate from the 
Supreme Council to bid in the tender can participate in 
the sorting tender.’ It is clear that as a matter of priority 
RTÜK aims to protect the interests of the old players in 
the sector. Experts point out that the discriminate 
treatment of broadcasting companies could be a 
ground for legal action based on the principle of 
equality guaranteed under the constitution.19 
Diversity and competition are also safeguarded by 
regulatory frameworks that influence the behaviour of 
players in the Turkish broadcasting market. The 
prevention of undue concentration can be achieved in 
various ways. In the past, RTÜK has experimented 
two different methods: In the first regulation (law no. 
3984), ownership restrictions had focused on the share 
limits, whereby (i) a company was allowed to establish 
only one radio and only one television station; and (ii) 
a shareholder in any given station could not hold more 
than 20 per cent of the shares and if he/she owned 
shares in several stations, the total ratio of his/her 
shares could not exceed 20 per cent. The law also had 
limited cross-ownership between the newspaper and 
broadcasting sectors. 
At a time when the parliament was discussing amend-
ments to the broadcasting regulation in 2002, the big 
media companies conducted effective lobbying against 
these ownership restrictions (Bek, 2003: 262). As a 
result, along with the 2002 amendments (law no. 4756) 
in the broadcasting law, the share ratios were introduced 
19 An official at a media regulatory agency, minutes of the 
workshop on the topic of ‘the new legislation on the 
structure and authority of the Radio and Television 
Supreme Council’ Istanbul, 11/03/2011. 
The predicament regarding the allocation of frequencies 
has created a barrier to entry to the market, creating a 
major obstacle to diversity and pluralism in the 
broadcasting media. 
27
provision of the former law stating that ‘the produc-
tion, investment, export, import, marketing and 
finance organizations shall not be permitted to 
engage in radio and television broadcasting’ has been 
repealed. With paragraph (ç) of Article 19, private 
radio and television organizations are allowed to be 
opened to public and be traded at the stock exchange, 
another provision differing from the former law. 
Paragraph (d) introduces a limitation on media 
ownership based on terrestrial broadcasting licences. 
Unlike the previous law, the share of commercial 
communication, advertising revenues and other 
sponsorships are regarded as criteria for protecting 
competition and preventing monopolisation in the 
media market. This arrangement seeks to prevent a 
media organization from getting more than 30 per 
cent of all commercial communication revenues in the 
market.21
Introducing another major change, law no. 6112 
increased the cap on the ratio of foreign shareholding 
in radio and television enterprises. Under the previous 
law, a foreign investor could not own more than 25 
percent of the shares of a broadcasting enterprise and 
could not hold shares in more than one enterprise in 
Turkey. This provision had created a significant 
obstacle to the foreign capital that started to show 
interest in the Turkish media sector, and anyhow 
various methods were used to circumvent this ban. 
Article 19 paragraph (f) of the new law raised the cap 
on foreign capital share to 50 percent and the number 
of media service provider enterprises that foreign 
investors could become shareholders of to two.
21 The law does not state how this share is to be calculated. 
A RTÜK official expressed that the three per cent share 
given to RTÜK by radio and television enterprises from 
their turnovers will be taken as a basis, hence allowing 
measurement of the 30 per cent limit through monthly 
regular metering. Minutes of the workshop on the topic of 
‘the new legislation on the structure and authority of the 
Radio and Television Supreme Council’ Istanbul, 
11/03/2011. 
as the new measure for restrictions on ownership. 
Accordingly, if the average annual viewing or listening 
ratio of a television or a radio enterprise exceeded 20 
percent, then the capital share of a real or legal person 
or a capital group in an enterprise should not exceed 50 
per cent. The highest ratio recorded at the time was 16 
per cent, indicating that the legal limit was too difficult 
to reach for any broadcasting company. The new 
amendment also removed the restrictions on cross-
ownership and participation in public tenders and the 
stock market. Eventually, there remained no legal 
restrictions on media ownership. A research commis-
sioned by RTÜK showed that the 2002 amendments 
enabled a media company to own 244 local and regional 
and 30 (medium sized) national stations at the same 
time (Cankaya and Yamaner, 2006: 240). 
However, an intervention by the Constitutional Court 
changed this legislative framework soon after the 
adoption of the amendments. The court cancelled the 
two clauses of Article 29 governing media ownership 
on the ground that they caused monopolisation in the 
Turkish broadcasting market and violated Article 167 
of the constitution which tasks the state with the 
prevention of ‘the formation, in practice or by 
agreement, of monopolies and cartels in the markets,’ 
as well as Articles 26 and 28 guaranteeing respec-
tively freedom of expression and freedom of press.
The current state of affairs concerning media owner-
ship regulations was introduced by the recent 
broadcasting law (no. 6112) in 2011. Article 19 regulates 
the establishment and share ratios of radio and 
television organizations. As under the previous law, 
the right to establish radio and television stations is 
granted to corporations only; political parties, trade 
unions, professional organizations, co-ops, associa-
tions and local administrations are not allowed to 
own radio or television stations.20 However, the 
20 This obstacle, which still exists in the new law, also 
receives criticism that the broadcasting ban on faculties 
of communication prevents news making, education and 
specialized broadcasting (İLAD, 2010).
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As a result of the liberalisation of the legal regime 
governing media ownership, between 2002 and 2008, 
35 national and 30 international mergers and purchase 
transactions took place in the media sector. These 
transactions peaked in 2005 and 2006 (Sözeri, 2009). 
Editorial independence was never factored in the 
merger and acquisition process and, as a result, the 
media sales frequently led to layoffs. Following the 
sale of the daily Milliyet, a senior columnist and 
reporter of the paper commented on this reality: 
‘Milliyet was sold like a refrigerator factory’ (Cemal, 
2011). After the transfer of Star TV, one the biggest 
national television channels in Turkey (from Doğan 
Group to Doğuş Group), about 15 journalists were let go.
3.2. COMPETITION IN MEDIA MARKET
What makes the media sector attractive for investors 
is the media’s power to influence public opinion and 
gaining revenues from advertising. Not only does 
advertising provide the main source of income for 
media owners, but it also gives the commercial media 
its characteristic look and sound, and orients the 
content offered to the audience, who are also the 
commercial target that advertisers want to reach 
(Sinclair, 2006). Hence it is not possible to understand 
the ecosystem of the media in Turkey without an 
analysis of advertising expenditures and their 
distribution based on the subsectors and outlets that 
media owners invest in.
Advertising revenues have demonstrated a significant 
upward trend since 2002. According to the Association 
of Advertising Agencies (Reklamcılar Derneği), they 
reached about 2.5 billion USD in 2011. The Advertisers’ 
Association of Turkey (Reklamverenler Derneği) 
expects that the advertising revenues will increase to 
nearly 5 billion USD by 2015 (Pura, 2012). Considering 
that their ratio to GDP remains around 0.3 – 0.4 per 
cent, it is clear that advertising revenues have the 
potential to increase further. However, at the same 
time the media advertising pie is also far from being 
large enough. As indicated in Table 1, the advertising 
pie is almost entirely divided between the big media 
groups in all of the subsectors (except for cinema and 
outdoors) of the media.
The new Broadcasting Law (no. 6112) regards the share 
of commercial communication, advertising revenues 
and other sponsorships as a criterion for protecting 
competition and preventing monopolization in the 
media markets. This provision prevents a media 
organization from getting more than 30 per cent of all 
commercial communication revenues in the market. 
Broadcasters and the Competition Authority foresee 
potential problems in the implementation of this 
provision.22
In order to comply with this new requirement under 
the new law, the biggest media group (Doğan Group) 
sold its second biggest television channel Star TV to 
Doğuş Group (Hakan, 2012). On the other hand, as it 
can be seen from the forecasts in Table 1, this hando-
ver was insufficient to increase competition in the 
television broadcasting sector. The forecast for the 
share of ‘others’ decreased from 23% to 20%. It is 
clear that, especially in some sectors access to 
information is controlled by the big media groups and 
this structure does not enable the independent 
players to increase their advertising revenues.
22 Notes of the workshop on the topic of ‘investment and 
competition relations in the media sector: the present and 
the future of the sector,’ Istanbul, 21/04/2011. 
Editorial independence was never factored in the merger 
and acquisition process and, as a result, the media sales 
frequently led to layoffs.
The advertising pie is almost entirely divided between the 
big media groups in all of the subsectors (except for cinema 
and outdoors) of the media.
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million TL (2,5 million EUR) and another subsidiary 
media company to a fine of 444 thousand TL (186 
thousand EUR) pecuniary fine on the grounds that it 
abused its dominant position in the media through 
offering discounts in advertising sales and making 
agreements with media planning agencies.23 Consid-
ering particularly the high concentrated market 
structure of the newspaper sector, such infringements 
of competition rules can be a fatal risk for the small 
and independent players and thereby endanger plural-
ism in the media. 
It is important to add that the executive decree no. 
649 of 17 August 2011 put an end to the independence 
of the Competition Authority by subjecting it to the 
power of the executive.
23 The decision is available at http://www.rekabet.gov.tr/
dosyalar/tefhim/tefhim67.pdf (date accessed 6 December 
2011).
Table 1: Shares of Media Groups in Advertising Revenues (%) 2011 and Forecasts for 2012
 TV Newspaper Magazine Radio Internet
Doğan Group 36 58 30 8 20
Forecast for 2012 27 58 30 8 20
Çukurova Group 12 3 6 6 1
Forecast for 2012 12 3 6 6 1
Turkuvaz Medya Group 19 24 18 2 4
Forecast for 2012 19 24 18 1 4
Doğuş Group 8 4 9 7
Forecast for 2012 20 4 9 7
Ciner Group 2 1 3  2
Forecast for 2012 2 1 3 2
Other 23 14 39 75 66
Forecast for 2012 20 14 39 76 66
Source: Mindshare, 2010, 2012(f)
One should note that, Law on the Protection of 
Competition (no. 4054) has been in effect in Turkey 
since 1994, and it is in compliance with the EU’s 
competition rules set out in Articles 81-82 of the 
Treaty of Rome. In other words, the Competition Law 
was enacted as part of the EU harmonization process. 
However, until 2000, the Competition Authority was 
inactive regarding cases concerning the Turkish media 
sector (Pekman, 2002).
Under Law no. 4054, in examining applications 
concerning the media, the Competition Authority is 
required to assess whether basic rules of competition 
have been violated, a dominant position in the market 
has been created, and, if so, whether such dominant 
position has been abused. The Competition Authority 
has issued several decisions concerning the protection 
of competition in the media markets. ‘The infringe-
ments of competition’ (50 per cent) and ‘merger-
acquisition and privatization’ (33 per cent) constituted 
the major grounds of the decisions issued between 
2008 and 2010. One of these decisions concerned the 
Doğan Group. On 5 April 2011, the authority sentenced 
the group’s companies to a fine of approximately 6 
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Broadcasting
There is a big dispersal imbalance among the media as 
also seen in Table 1. The biggest share always goes to 
the television. The most important reason for this is 
that television has a strong influence on public 
opinion in Turkey due to high ratings and the low costs 
of advertising. According to data from the Radio 
Television Supreme Council, there are currently 24 
national, 15 regional and 209 local television enter-
prises on air.  However, the high share of television 
ads, the competition between lots of television 
channels limit the growth of advertising revenues 
across all other media outlets and prevent a more 
balanced distribution of advertising shares. 
The competition in the broadcasting sector was 
revived with Law no. 6112, which increased the cap on 
the ratio of foreign shareholding in radio and televi-
sion enterprises. After the entry of Al Jazeera into the 
Turkish market, Çalık Group -the owner of the second 
biggest media group in Turkey- put its biggest 
television channel (ATV) and biggest newspaper 
(Sabah) on sale in January 2012. In addition to other 
foreign investors, the owner of News Corp. Rupert 
Murdoch showed an interest in bidding for these 
companies and shortly after met with Prime Minister 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in March 2012. In the case of 
acquisition of ATV-Sabah by Murdoch, he would 
become the biggest or the second biggest group in the 
Turkish broadcasting sector because he already owns 
another TV channel (Fox TV) (Semerci, 2012). On the 
other hand, considering that the ATV-Sabah is run by 
the Prime Minister’s son-in-law, the meeting between 
Murdoch and Erdoğan reinforced the growing 
perception that investors who wish to invest in the 
Turkish broadcasting media need to contact the 
government directly (Sözeri and Güney 2011).
The most important factor in the distribution of 
advertising shares and thus competition in the 
broadcasting sector are the ratings. Lately, the sector 
was struck with a major inquiry on the rating prac-
tices. A criminal investigation was launched against a 
number of production companies on charges of unlaw-
ful disclosure of television viewers and the fabrication 
of ratings through paying covert remuneration to 
respondents. Upon these developments, the Turkish 
Television Viewing Research Committee (TİAK) 
terminated its contract with AGB, the company which 
has measured ratings in Turkey since 1989 and signed 
a new contract with TNS/Kantarmedya in May 2012 
(TIAK, 2012). 
Press
The second largest share in advertising revenues goes 
to the print media and subsectorally to newspapers. 
According to TURKSTAT’s Print Media Statistics, there 
were 163 national, 73 regional and 2368 local newspa-
pers published in Turkey. National newspaper 
consumption is over 80%, followed by local papers 
with 15.3% and regional newspapers with a share of 
2.4%. At the national level, the competition in this 
sector takes place over advertising revenues rather 
than sales. However, due to the highly concentrated 
nature of the market, most newspapers cannot 
generate optimal advertising revenues and therefore 
operate in the red. The concentration is so high that 
two media groups (Doğan and Turkuvaz) dominate 
the market by over 80 per cent. This duopoly is not 
only limited to the advertising revenues; the two 
media groups control the entire newspaper and 
magazine distribution sector excluding subscriptions. 
Moreover, as it can be seen in Table 1, even the 
acquisition of two significant newspapers (Milliyet 
and Vatan) of Doğan Group by Demirören Group 
couldn’t decrease the share of the duo.
The climate of deep political polarization in general 
and in the media in particular is also reflected in the 
advertising revenues. Newspapers have been more 
affected by this compared to other subsectors. A 
telling example of this phenomenon is daily Taraf, an 
The competition in the broadcasting sector was revived 
with Law no. 6112, which increased the cap on the ratio of 
foreign shareholding in radio and television enterprises. 
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national news outlets have their own websites that 
include news, columns, commentaries and user-gen-
erated contents in addition to independent web 
portals. However these new sources of information 
fail to provide diversity of viewpoints because of the 
prevalence of copy-and-paste practices online (Tunç 
and Görgülü, 2012).
On the other hand, recent surveys show that internet 
is shifting media consumption. According to IAB 
Internet Measurement Survey (Yaşayan, 2011) about 
70 % of young people between ages 15-34 years are 
watching TV, listening to radio and reading newspa-
pers via internet. 
Including the big media groups that dominate the 
internet, most players in this new forum have applied 
advertising based business model. In 2011, internet 
advertising revenues in Turkey were 408 million USD 
according to the IAB Europe Adex Report (2012). As in 
many other countries, the big share goes to interna-
tional giants such as Google, Facebook, Yahoo, MSN. 
As a result, the advertising revenues that feed the 
online news organisations are still insufficient to 
create a self-sufficient and independent online media 
which could offer an alternative to the concentrated 
mainstream media.
Telecommunications
The blurring of the boundaries between the media, 
information technologies and telecommunication 
accentuates the essential nature of the relationship 
between the media organs and telecommunication 
companies (Barr, 2006). Türk Telekom, the largest 
telecommunication company and the single fixed 
telephone operator in Turkey which owns the infra-
structure for all distribution networks, all telephone 
independent newspaper notorious for its critical 
coverage of the military’s attempts to overthrow the 
government in the early 2000s. During its first two 
years, the newspaper operated under great financial 
difficulty due to its inability to get advertising from 
the private sector, which was reluctant to be associ-
ated with a newspaper deemed radical and militant by 
the establishment. While Taraf managed to survive, at 
present some companies shy from giving advertising 
to the paper for fear of damage to their commercial 
reputation.24 In order to overcome its financial 
problems and generate capital for its operation, Taraf 
has opened its 16.6 %  shares to public and achieved 
nearly 3.5 million USD in February 2012.
The former chief editor of Star, considered among the 
‘proponent’ newspapers, pointed out that the 
pro-government newspapers are getting ads through 
exerting political pressure on companies (Özvarış, 
2012). On the other hand, the big media groups that 
could no longer pursue balancing acts between the 
army, the government, the opposition and the 
business world are also too weak vis-à-vis the 
monopolized political power of AK Party government 
(Cemal, 2012).
Internet
The big capital groups, including big media groups, 
were the first to make substantial investments in 
Internet publishing in Turkey. Internet journalism was 
also started by the big media groups carrying their 
newspapers over to the Internet after 1996. Subse-
quently, news sites operating only on the Internet 
have emerged (Çevikel, 2004). Today, almost all 
24 Interview with Markar Esayan, Vice Chief Editor, daily 
Taraf, by Ceren Sözeri, Istanbul, 12/07/2011.
The advertising revenues that feed the online news 
organisations are still insufficient to create a self-sufficient 
and independent online media.
The climate of deep political polarization in 
the media is also reflected in the advertising 
revenues. Newspapers have been more 
affected by this.
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exchanges and transmission channels, has moved into 
the area of media content in recent years. At present, 
the company has games and music portals in addition 
to a web TV service and IPTV platform. Türk Telekom 
has transformed itself into one of the biggest players 
of the media sector, and, considering the advantages 
it has, this situation has adverse effects for competi-
tion and diversity of content in the Turkish media.
Problems caused by the competitive advantages of 
Türk Telekom have occasionally been carried to the 
agenda of the Competition Authority. Officials of the 
authority point out that their sanctioning powers are 
limited under the existing legislation, and that social 
support is needed for pushing the development of 
more effective competition regulations. Members of 
the Radio and Television Broadcasters Professional 
Union (Radyo ve Televizyon Yayıncıları Meslek Birliği), 
on the other hand, indicate that they cannot criticize 
Türk Telekom’s position in the market because it is one 
of the biggest advertisers for TV operators.25
3.3  STATE INTERVENTION IN THE 
MEDIA: SUBSIDIES, OFFICIAL 
ADVERTISEMENTS 
In Turkey there are no direct subsidies for commercial 
broadcasting companies. The official advertisements 
and announcements distributed by BİK are important 
sources of revenue for small, independent and local 
press, which are economically vulnerable vis-à-vis the 
existing media market structure. 
The ways in which state advertisings are allocated and 
its implications for state intervention in the media 
have recently become a topic of public debate when 
25 Minutes of the workshop on the topic of ‘investment and 
competition relations in the media sector: the present and 
the future of the sector,’ Istanbul, 21/04/ 2011. 
the owner of Apoyevmatini, a weekly of the Greek 
community, announced his decision to close down the 
paper due to the sharp decline in its advertising and 
sales revenues.26 In making this announcement at a 
public conference, Mihail Vasiliadis noted the govern-
ment’s refusal to give state advertising to minority 
newspapers as a factor in the financial difficulties of 
his paper. The public reaction resulted in the President 
of BİK meeting with Vasiliadis and subsequently with 
representatives of all other newspapers belonging to 
Greek Orthodox, Armenian and Jewish communities. 
The outcome of these meetings was an ad hoc decision 
by BİK to allocate a one-time payment of a total of 
250,000 TL to six minority newspapers (Turkish Press, 
2011).27 While a significant relief for their financial 
difficulties, the decision fell short of meeting the 
expectations of minority newspapers for a formal 
commitment of state advertising. In explaining why it 
was not able to do so, BİK cited the legal obstacles 
stemming from the decision no. 67 of its general 
assembly, which lays out the conditions for state 
advertising. Pursuant to these regulations, newspa-
pers eligible for state advertising had to be published 
on a daily basis, employ at least seven staff, and have 
a minimum of eight pages and a circulation of 5 
thousand, criteria which minority newspapers were 
unable to fulfil. While BİK promised to revisit the 
regulations to develop a solution for the minority 
media, the agency was concerned that the softening of 
the rules would lead to abuse by individuals who 
would claim state support for ‘one-page “newspaper” ’ 
(Karaca, 2011). At a workshop organized for this 
research project, this sentiment was echoed by a high 
level BİK official, who pointed out that among 
recipients of state advertising are ‘newspapers’ where 
nepotism plays a great role in the hiring of individuals 
without journalism background simply because they 
26 The principal reason for the decline was the economic 
crisis in Greece, prior to which the newspaper was 
receiving financial support from Greek companies.
27 These publications are are: Apoyevmatini (weekly) and İho 
(daily) of the Greek orthodox community, Şalom (weekly) 
of the Jewish community, Jamanak (daily), Marmara (daily) 
and Agos (weekly) of the Armenian community.
Türk Telekom has transformed itself into one of the 
biggest players of the media sector, adversely affecting 
competition and diversity of content.
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making and management organ of the corporation. 
Members serve a four-year term. The Director General, 
who is also the Head of Administrative Board, is 
appointed for a four-year term by the Cabinet from 
among three candidates nominated by RTÜK. The 
Cabinet appoints two members of the Administrative 
Board from among the vice directors, and the remain-
ing four from candidates nominated by RTÜK from 
fields of electronics or mass communication, law, 
business administration or economics, arts and culture.
TRT is funded by a combination of public and commer-
cial revenues. The major sources of funding are: a 
broadcasting (licence) fee generated from the sale of 
television and radio receivers, music sets and VTRs; 
two per cent of electricity bills paid by each consumer; 
and a share allocated from the national budget. 
Following the abolishment of its monopoly with the 
launch of private broadcasting in 1993, the public 
broadcaster has had to compete with commercial 
televisions and radio channels for the advertising 
revenues and its advertising income decreased about 
50 per cent. A few years later, 87,1 per cent of advertis-
ing revenues was held by private broadcasters 
(Erdemir, 2011). TRT also found itself in a ratings race 
with its commercial rivals. Even though, it had 
withdrew its channels from the rating system run by 
AGB accusing the latter of ‘violating competition 
regulations’ in 2010 (Today’s Zaman,  2010) TRT 
re-involved in new ratings measurement system 
applied by TNS/Kantarmedia from May 2012.  
These competitive moves by TRT have been criticized 
on the grounds of being in contradiction with public 
service philosophy and the social function of the 
agency (Cankaya, 2008). On the other hand, the 
commercialisation of the broadcasting environment 
revealed consumer dissatisfaction with TRT’s services. 
are family members or friends of the owner.28 Never-
theless, BİK amended its regulation in February 2012. 
Accordingly, newspapers published by communities 
which have ‘minority’ status under the Treaty of 
Lausanne are eligible to receive official advertisement 
upon written application, provided that they have paid 
their taxes and social security contributions to the 
state (Karaca, 2012). The restriction of the amend-
ments to the three non-Muslim communities regarded 
to have minority status under Lausanne29 is discon-
certing, however, since it suggests that other groups 
will not be able to benefit from the new regulation.30   
3.4  PUBLIC SERVICE BROADCASTING
TRT, established in 1964, is the sole public service 
broadcaster in Turkey. It owns 15 television (five 
international, nine national, one regional) and nine 
radio channels. A 1971 amendment to law no. 1568 put 
an end to the autonomy TRT had enjoyed since its 
establishment. Article 133 of the 1982 Constitution 
restructured TRT as an impartial public corporate body. 
The Radio and Television Law (no.2954) centralized the 
organisational structure of the body, removing 
representatives of academia, NGOs and professional 
organisations from the TRT board (Cankaya, 2008). 
Today, the Administrative Board is the highest decision-
28 An official at BİK, notes of the workshop on the topic of 
‘human resources problems and the future of the media 
sector’, Ankara, 18/12/ 2010.
29 While the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne grants minority status 
to all non-Muslim communities in Turkey, the state since 
1925 has unlawfully restricted the scope of the Treaty to 
the following three groups: Armenians, Greek Orthodox 
and Jews. 
30 The Syriac community in Turkey launched its first 
newspaper in March 2012. Titled Sabro,(which means 
‘patience’ in the Syriac language) is a monthly bilingual 
paper published in Turkish and the Syriac language. 
According to a February 2012 regulation, 
minority newspapers are now eligible to 
receive official advertisement upon certain 
conditions.
TRT’s financing system and revenues have been 
questioned because of its endorsement of official ideology.
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Although it provided a mixed programming with an 
emphasis on entertainment, TRT maintained a 
distinctly paternalistic and elitist approach and 
observed strict codes that sometimes amounted to 
censorship (Çatalbaş, 2003). As a result, TRT’s 
financing system and revenues have been questioned 
because of ‘its permanent endorsement of the official 
position of the state and/or government on almost any 
subject ... and careful avoidance from any engagement 
with controversial issues’ (Barış, 2005: 296).
3.5  THE IMPACT OF EU INTEGRATION 
IN MEDIA POLICY MAKING 
The media policies in Turkey have undergone significant 
change as a result of the liberalization of the media and 
foreign investors’ entry into the market. Laws which 
used to regulate public service broadcasting now focus 
on regulating commercial publishing, protecting 
competition and preventing monopolization. Behind 
this change lie the rapid improvements in information 
and communication technologies and the need to align 
Turkey’s media regulations with those of the EU. As 
stated earlier, one of the early harmonization efforts 
was made in the Competition Law (no. 4504).
The impact of the EU integration on media policy 
making was perhaps most visible in the recent 
enactment of Law no. 6112. In preparing the draft, 
Turkish policy makers strived to develop a text in 
harmony with the EU’s Audiovisual Media Services 
Directive (AVMSD). Indeed, the new law, which is 
much more comprehensive than the former (law 
no.3984) and also covers new technology broadcast-
ers (such as on-demand service providers), appears to 
be in harmony with AVMSD in terms of scope, access, 
regulation of commercial communication. However, 
the law also requires radio broadcasting to be in 
compliance with Article 133 of the constitution.31 
31 This expansive scope of the law and the effort to regulate 
radio broadcasting with primarily television focused 
regulations are points of criticism. Minutes of the 
workshop on the topic of ‘the new legislation on the 
structure and authority of the Radio and Television 
Supreme Council’ Istanbul, 11/03/2011.
Furthermore, the law goes beyond the Directive by 
introducing additional content and ownership 
restrictions the latter does  not contain. 
The greatest criticism to the new law is that it focuses 
too much on commercial communication and ignores 
the public service dimension of the media. Unlike in 
AVMSD, the excessively-detailed broadcasting 
principles laid out with ambiguous wording provide 
potential loopholes to limit freedom of expression 
(Sümer and Adaklı, 2011). When preparing the new law, 
the opinions of professional radio and TV broadcast-
ing organizations were gathered, and the draft law 
was presented to the public on RTÜK’s website. 
However, some academics and non-governmental 
organizations stated that their views were not 
reflected in the eventual text, and that the law 
regulates only commercial broadcasting rather than 
ensuring the freedom and diversity of the media. 
Critics point out that neither the consultative drafting 
process nor the fact that the law is in compliance with 
AVMSD are sufficient to render it a democratic piece of 
legislation.32
32 Ankara University, Faculty of Communication, Opinion on 
the draft broadcasting law. Also, minutes of the workshop 
on the topic of ‘the new legislation on the structure and 
authority of the Radio and Television Supreme Council’ 
Istanbul, 11/03/2011.  
Neither the consultative drafting process nor 
the fact that the law is in compliance with 
AVMSD are sufficient to render Law no. 6112 a 
democratic piece of legislation.
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duty to protect the youth against abuse, exploitation 
and ‘bad habits’ such as alcoholism, drugs and 
gambling to the state, and as well as the responsibility 
to raise young people in accordance ‘the principles and 
revolutions of Atatürk.’ Making note of this ‘state-
centrist approach,’ the Council of Europe (CoE) 
Commissioner for Human Rights pointed out the 
pervasive recognition ‘that the letter and spirit of the 
present Turkish Constitution represent a major 
obstacle to the effective protection of pluralism and 
freedom of expression’  (Hammarberg, 2011: para. 11). 
4.1  MEDIA SPECIFIC LAWS
The laws governing media content are drafted in the 
same spirit of nationalism and conservatism em-
braced in the constitution. Despite relatively im-
proved through the EU process, media laws contain 
restrictions based on principles of national unity, 
national security, and the reforms and principles of 
Atatürk.34 While these laws do pay lip service to 
freedom of the press and freedom of expression, the 
latter are secondary to the protection of the state and 
its founding principles. 
34 Examples of such interdictions in laws governing media 
content: ‘the existence and independence of the Turkish 
Republic, the territorial and national integrity of the State, 
the reforms and principles of Atatürk’ (Broadcasting Law, 
Art. 8); ‘national security’ and ‘territorial integrity’ (Press 
Law, Art. 3); ‘crimes against Atatürk’ (Internet Law, Art. 8). 
Article 25 of the constitution guarantees freedom of 
expression and protects individuals from state 
interference on expression of their opinions. Article 28 
protects freedom of the press and imposes on the 
state a positive obligation to undertake the requisite 
measures to ensure the exercise of this freedom. The 
constitution guarantees the right to declare or 
disseminate opinions individually or collectively and 
to access and share information and opinions without 
state interference. 
What lies beyond this liberal façade, however, is a 
framework where nationalism, statism and cultural 
conservatism emerge as the supreme values looming 
over individual rights. The exercise of fundamental 
freedoms is subject to compliance with; inter alia, 
national security, national unity and state secrets.33 
The constitution entrusts the state with the duty to 
make sure that citizens act and think in accordance 
with the ideals of Atatürk, the values of the nation and 
the morals of the family. Article 41 identifies the family 
as the ‘foundation of the Turkish society’ and tasks the 
state with taking measures to protect ‘the peace and 
welfare of the family’ and to protect children against 
all kinds of abuse and violence. Article 58 allots the 
33 The restrictions on the press are laid out in constitution 
Art. 26: ‘The exercise of these freedoms may be restricted 
for the purposes of protecting national security, public 
order and public safety, the basic characteristics of the 
Republic and safeguarding the indivisible integrity of the 
State with its territory and nation, preventing crime, 
punishing offenders, withholding information duly 
classified as a state secret, protecting the reputation and 
rights and private  and family life of others, or protecting 
professional secrets as prescribed by law, or ensuring the 
proper functioning of the judiciary.’ These restrictions are 
enforced through rigorous measures, including the 
confiscation of the print media. Art. 28. 
What lies beyond this liberal façade, however, is a 
framework where nationalism, statism and cultural 
conservatism emerge as the supreme values looming over 
individual rights.
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The Press Law protects freedom of the press, the right 
to information, and the right of reply to defamatory or 
untruthful news. While the law guarantees journalists’ 
right to protect their news sources, it does not 
‘include a strong public interest for the protection of 
journalists’ (Hammarberg, 2011: para. 30).  At the 
same time, the law restricts these freedoms on 
grounds of ‘national security,’ ‘territorial integrity’ 
and ‘state secrets.’ Article 11 attributes criminal 
liability to editors and translators of written work in 
cases where the author is abroad or unidentified. 
The new Broadcasting Law (no. 6112) ‘brings only 
partial improvement’ in expanding media freedom 
(European Commission, 2011: 27). It comprises a wide 
catalogue of restrictions, going well beyond the EU 
Directive which the law claims to be in compliance 
with. While the directive cites the protection of 
children and prevention of hate speech as the only 
grounds for content restriction, the law restricts 
content on grounds of, inter alia, ‘the national and 
moral values of society, general morality and the 
protection of the family.’35 That the state defines 
broadcasting principles in punitive laws rather than 
enabling the media to develop its own values is 
criticized as an infringement of freedom of expression 
and freedom of the press.36 A further criticism is the 
conservative nature of the values endorsed in the 
Broadcasting Law, evident in the exclusion of sexual 
orientation as a ground of discrimination.37 
The amorphous concepts such as ‘general morality,’ 
‘the protection of the family,’ and ‘the national and 
35 Broadcasting Law (no. 6112) Art. 8. 
36 Minutes of the workshop on the topic of ‘the new 
legislation on the structure and authority of the Radio and 
Television Supreme Council’ Istanbul, 11/03/2011. 
37 Ibid.
moral values of society’ that the law embraces as 
broadcasting principles leave RTÜK with a wide 
margin of manoeuvre. The agency has the powers to 
sanction the media with warnings, monetary and 
administrative sanctions, suspensions and revocation 
of licences.38 In the past, under the previous more 
restrictive version of the Broadcasting Law (no.3984), 
RTÜK had imposed heavy sanctions against dissident 
and minority media.39 However, these sanctions by 
and large remained out of the limelight of wider public 
opinion. It was sanctions against popular TV series 
aired on television stations in recent years that 
generated widespread public debate. During the first 
half of 2011, RTÜK issued warnings and imposed fines 
against television stations on grounds of disrespect of 
historical characters (Önderoğlu, 2011),40 broadcasting 
homosexual scenes (Gazeteciler.com, 2011),41 the use 
of ‘poor Turkish and slang’ and the use of alcohol 
(Söylemez, 2011a).42 In 2011, RTÜK issued 89 monetary 
fines, 383 warnings, 27 program suspensions and one 
notification against 20 radio stations and 480 TV 
channels (Gülcan, 2012).The sanctions received mixed 
38 Law no. 6112, Art. 32 and 33. 
39 For example, RTÜK suspended the broadcasting of local, 
regional and national operators for a total of 3,132 days in 
2001. On 8 February 2002 alone, the agency suspended 
the broadcasting of 18 national and local media operators 
for a total of 128 days. 
40 RTÜK issued a warning to SHOW TV for having portrayed 
the Ottoman Sultan Suleyman as a man fond of women 
and alcohol in the series Magnificent Century. 
41 In March 2011, RTÜK initiated proceedings against 
Digiturk, a cable television company, for having 
broadcasted a gay marriage scene in the movie Sex and the 
City 2. The agency based the proceedings on the violation 
of ‘national and moral value and Turkish family structure.’ 
42 RTÜK issued a warning to STAR TV because of the use of 
slang and alcohol in the series Behzat Ç. The warning was 
issued because of the alleged negative influence of the 
series on children and youth. 
Despite relatively improved through the EU process, media 
laws contain restrictions based on principles of national 
unity, national security, and the reforms and principles of 
Atatürk.
The amorphous concepts such as ‘general 
morality,’ ‘the protection of the family,’ and 
‘the national and moral values of society’  
leave RTÜK with a wide margin of manoeuvre. 
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The Internet Law (no. 5651) of 2007 regulates content 
providers, domain providers, access providers and 
collective usage providers.44 The law authorizes the 
banning of access to websites where there are sufficient 
reasons for a ‘suspicion’ that the following crimes 
enumerated in Article 8 are committed: incitement to 
suicide; sexual exploitation and abuse of children; 
facilitating the use of drugs; obscenity; prostitution; 
arranging a place or facility for gambling; and crimes 
against defined in the Law on Crimes Committed 
against Atatürk (no. 5816). The appertain procedural 
regulation sets forth principles that publications on the 
internet must adhere to, in addition to respect for 
human dignity and fundamental rights, the protection 
of the physical, mental and moral development of youth 
and children, and respect for the peace and welfare of 
the family.45 According to the Internet Law, access can 
be blocked by a judge (at the investigation phase), a 
court (at the prosecution phase) or by TİB where the 
content provider is outside of Turkey or where the 
content concerns sexual abuse of children or obscenity. 
Domestic experts point out that the legal grounds for 
blocking access to the internet are ambiguous; that 
blocking orders are usually issued on the basis of 
domain name, and as a consequence, block access to 
all content included under that name, and that in 
cases where the content provider or domain provider 
is abroad, TİB orders can be executed without the 
approval of a judge or a court.46 International experts 
44 İnternet Ortamında Yapılan Yayınların Düzenlenmesi ve 
Bu Yayınlar Yoluyla İşlenen Suçlarla Mücadele Edilmesi 
Hakkında Kanun [Law on the Regulation of Broadcasts on 
the Internet and on Combatting Crimes Committed 
through the Internet], no. 5651, 4 May 2007, Official 
Gazette, no. 26530, 23 May 2007.
45 İnternet Ortamında Yapılan Yayınların Düzenlenmesine 
Dair Usul ve Esaslar Hakkında Yönetmelik [Regulation on 
the Procedures and Substance of the Regulation of 
Broadcasts on the Internet], Official Gazette, No. 26716, 
30 November 2007, Art. 4(1). 
46 5651 Sayılı Kanun Çerçevesinde Erişim Engelleme Kararları 
[Decisions of Access Bans within the Framework of Law no. 
5651], available at: http://www.internethukuk.com/index.
php?option=com_content&view=article&id=77:5651-sayl-
kanun-cercevesinde-eriim-engelleme-
kararlar&catid=34:genel-kategori&Itemid=50 (date 
accessed 21 December 2011).
reactions. On one hand, the fans of TV series initiated 
campaigns via social media,43 while human rights 
groups protested RTÜK for discrimination against 
LGBT individuals (Amargi, 2011; Belge, 2011). On the 
other hand, it was the social pressure from the 
audience, the government and conservative political 
parties that mobilized RTÜK in the first place. The 
agency received 74,911 complaints about the series on 
the Ottoman Sultan Süleyman in only three weeks, 
which amounted to 93 per cent of all complaints filed 
during that period (Önderoğlu, 2011). The criticisms 
expressed by Bülent Arınç, the Deputy Prime Minister 
in charge of the press, TRT, the Anatolian Agency and 
various nationalist and Islamist parties further 
increased the pressure on RTÜK (Üstündağ, 2011). In a 
speech he delivered on 24 April 2012, on the occasion 
of the 18th anniversary of the founding of RTÜK, 
Deputy Prime Minister Arınç reopened the discussion 
by stating that the “marginal issues addressed in TV 
series such as relations between opposite sex, incest 
within family are testing the tolerance of society” 
(Turkish media, 24 April 2012). At the same meeting, in 
response to criticisms that RTÜK is not ‘tough enough’ 
against television broadcasters, the President of 
RTÜK said that the agency is “not a censorship body” 
and that “it is out of the question to suspend or 
impose sanctions against every program which 
receives complaints” (RTÜK, 2012). Arınç’s state-
ments were protested by journalists for being 
“threatening” and “bordering on fascism” (Altan, 2012).
There were also rare occasions where RTÜK resorted 
to its powers to sanction discrimination against 
minorities. The agency suspended a women’s show on 
ATV, a national television station, on grounds of 
‘inciting people to revenge and hatred.’ The sanction 
was imposed after the host of the program criticized 
the Kurdish population of Van, a province badly hit by 
an earthquake in October 2011, for seeking rescue from 
the same police that they ‘had thrown stones at’ 
during mass demonstrations (Ertürk, 2011). 
43 For example, followers of Behzat Ç. initiated a campaign 
on Twitter, which ‘rocketed to first place in the section of 
“trends” in Turkey.’ (Gülcan, 2011).
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point out that ‘[E]ven if it is legitimate to remove some 
content, such as child pornography and hate speech 
inciting to violence from the internet, the blocking of 
internet sites often results in the blocking of content 
which has nothing to do with child pornography or 
hate speech inciting to violence’ (Hammarberg, 2011a). 
The issue was eventually taken to the ECtHR. As of 
March 2012, there were five pending petitions 
challenging the bans on Youtube, Google and Last.fm. 
The ECtHR joined the applications concerning Google 
and Last.fm.47 While the government is in the process 
of preparing amendments to the Internet Law, the 
content of the possible changes have not yet been 
disclosed to the public.
Both the TİB and the courts do not hesitate from 
resorting to their sanctioning powers under the 
Internet Law. The official statistics on internet 
blockings are not disclosed to the public (Akdeniz, 
2011). According to a source which keeps track of 
blocked websites, as of 26 April 2012, a total of  
18,345 websites are blocked in Turkey  
(engelliweb.com, 2011).  Among the blocked sites are 
news websites reporting on sensitive political issues 
such as the Kurdish question, LGBT websites and 
websites on sexuality (Akdeniz, 2011: 166). As of the 
end of May 2012, 84 per cent of the decisions to ban 
access have been issued by TİB, five per cent by a 
court and around four per cent by a prosecutor.48 
While the catalogue crimes enumerated under  
the Internet Law are the only legal grounds for 
blocking access to the internet, in practice blocking 
orders have also been based on the Anti-Terror  
Law, other provisions of the Turkish Penal Code,  
 
47 Information received from Yaman Akdeniz, 6 March 2012.  
48 For current statistics, visit http://engelliweb.com/
istatistikler/ (last accessed 28 May 2012).
such as Article 301, and intellectual property rights 
(Hammarberg, 2011: para.62).49
In February 2011, BTK released a decision titled the 
‘safe usage of the Internet,’ requiring service providers 
to propose the option to use one of four packages to 
their customers: family package, children package, 
standard package and domestic package (BTK, 2011). 
The decision was perceived as yet another attempt to 
restrict civil liberties and to render ‘censorship 
widespread and systematic’ (Altıparmak and Akdeniz, 
2011).  50,000 individuals organized through the social 
media held a public protest against the measure, 
while the Communication Foundation and Bianet 
applied to the Council of State (Danıştay) for a stay of 
execution. On the occasion of the World Day against 
Cyber-Censorship on 12 March 2010, Reporters 
without Borders (RSF) included Turkey among the 
‘Countries under surveillance’ (Reporters without 
Borders, 2011). Turkey remained in the list in 2011. 
According to the OSCE, if enforced, the filtering 
system ‘will lead to the first government controlled 
and maintained mandatory filtering system within the 
OSCE region’ (Akdeniz, 2011: 26). 
Visibly concerned, particularly with the international 
reaction, BTK argued that the measure did not 
constitute filtering because consumers were provided 
with a choice (Altıparmak and Akdeniz, 2011a). Yet, 
faced with growing criticism, the agency revised its 
decision in August 2011, reducing the number of 
packages to two (family package and child package) 
and making internet filters optional and applicable 
upon demand (BTK, 2011a). Following a three months 
trial period, the new filtering system came into effect 
on 22 November 2011. BTK’s revision of its earlier 
decision failed to put an end to the heated debate 
about internet censorship in Turkey. Some point out 
that ‘the introduction of this system … will lead to a 
DPI [deep packet inspection]-based monitoring and 
blocking system’ (Kırlıdoğ, 2011).  
49 An example of this was the independent media website 
www.istanbul.indymedia.org, which was blocked in 2008 
for having insulted Turkishness in violation of Article 301 
of the Penal Code. 
While the government is in the process of preparing 
amendments to the Internet Law, the content of the 
possible changes have not yet been disclosed to the public.
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4.2  PENAL LAWS
The principal obstacles to freedom of press and 
freedom of expression in Turkey stem from the 
criminal legal system. The Penal Code and the 
Anti-Terror Law are ‘at the origin of the vast majority 
of freedom of expression cases against Turkey brought 
to the European Court of Human Rights’ (Hammar-
berg, 2011: para.15). The following offences under the 
Penal Code provide the legal basis for cases against 
the media organs, journalists and human rights 
defenders: defamation (Article 125); setting up 
criminal organisations for the overthrow of the 
constitutional order (Article 314); encouraging military 
personnel to disobey the law (Article 319); discourag-
ing individuals from military service (Article 318); 
insulting the Turkish nation, state, parliament, 
government or the courts (Article 301); incitement to 
crime (Article 214); praising a crime or criminals 
(Article 215); incitement to hatred or animosity (Article 
216); and publishing or broadcasting obscene material 
(Article 226).50 
High level officials, including the Prime Minister, 
brought defamation cases against journalists criticis-
ing the government. In 2011, 24 journalists were 
sentenced to a total of 21 years and nine months of 
imprisonment and 48,000 TL (around 20,000 Euros) in 
fines in defamation cases. Two newspapers were fined 
to a total of 50,000 TL (Gülcan, 2012). In February 2012, 
the ECtHR gave its first ruling on this issue, finding a 
violation of freedom of expression (see section 4.4. for 
more details on this judgment). Prosecutors are 
50 While the law was drafted anew in the name of 
harmonizing national laws with the EU’s acquis, for some 
offences it merely re-numbered and re-worded provisions 
contained in the previous penal code. For example, 
Articles 215, 216, 301 and 318 of the new Penal Code 
regulate the same offences as Article 312, 159 and 155 of 
the previous law.
What was striking about the terms of the public 
debate was the mismatch between the discourse of 
the protestors and the BTK. While the former criti-
cized the filtering system as an infringement on 
freedom of communication and privacy rights, the 
latter sought to legitimize the measure on the  
basis of moral values and the protection of children. 
The principal reason for the strong public reaction 
against BTK was the fact that the measure was 
perceived as yet another effort of censorship in a 
country where excessively strong and arbitrary 
barriers to internet access had been causing public 
outrage. In April 2011, TİB had informed internet 
hosting companies of the banning of 138 words 
deemed to indicate illegal content from domain 
names. The list included words used in daily life,  
such as ‘animal’ as well as words deemed  
inappropriate by the agency, such as ‘gay.’ TİB 
pointed out that the failure to comply could result in 
punitive sanctions. Soon after, the agency took the 
matters in its own hands and ordered the hosting 
providers of a popular dictionary website (www.
eksisozluk.com) and the LGBT association Pembe 
Hayat (http://pembehayat.org/) to stop providing 
services to these websites. 
While Turkey has adopted a Right to Information  
Act in 2004, public agencies often resist providing 
information to citizens and civil society, in blatant 
disregard of their obligations. Despite decisions  
by the Right to Information Review Council and 
administrative courts, ‘there is still resistance to  
give information, and a high number of public  
authorities are disputing Council decisions,  
either by ignoring them, or by appealing to adminis-
trative courts to challenge such decisions’ (Akdeniz, 
2008). 
What was striking about the terms of the 
public debate was the mismatch between the 
discourse of the protestors and the BTK. 
The principal obstacles to freedom of press and freedom of 
expression in Turkey stem from the criminal legal system. 
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making increasing use of the Penal Code to decisively 
censor the media by penalising them for reporting on 
issues such as criminal cases against high ranking 
military officers. Recently, criminal cases are brought 
under Article 285 (breaching the confidentiality of 
investigations) and Article 288 (attempting to unduly 
influence the courts) against journalists who cover 
cases where military officers are accused of having 
committed crimes against the state. These two 
provisions ‘have come to particular prominence since 
2007, due to a steep increase in cases brought against 
journalists in connection with their writings on the 
Ergenekon case’ (Hammarberg, 2011: para.20). The 
European Commission noted that there were more 
than 4,000 ongoing investigations on the basis of 
these two provisions (EC, 2010: 20). The draft law 
submitted by the Ministry of Justice for an amendment 
of the Penal Code, including Articles 285 and 288 (EC, 
2011: 26), has not yet been taken up for review by the 
parliament. Neither has it been disclosed to the public. 
Another provision that the prosecutors refer to for 
censoring the press is Article 318, which makes the 
non-violent expression of views on conscientious 
objection a criminal offence and the publication of 
these views in the media an aggravating factor. The 
provision has caused the conviction of journalists for 
simply reporting on conscientious objectors who 
refuse to serve in the army. 
The most widely debated and criticised provision of the 
penal code has been Article 301, largely due to the high 
profile cases brought against intellectuals such as the 
Nobel laureate Orhan Pamuk. Five reputable colum-
nists of the national media were also prosecuted under 
this provision for having criticized the banning of an 
academic conference on the Armenian genocide of 1915.51 
51 These were Erol Katırcıoğlu, Haluk Şahin, Hasan Cemal, 
İsmet Berkan and Murat Belge.
Journalist Temel Demirer is being prosecuted under 
Article 301 since May 2008. Amidst growing interna-
tional pressure, the government amended, but did not 
abolish, the provision such that prosecution in each 
individual case is now subject to prior authorisation of 
the Minister of Justice. While this amendment has 
indeed decreased the number of proceedings launched 
under this provision, it has still been found inadequate 
by the human rights community. The ECtHR put an end 
to the debates on Article 301, finding in the case of 
Akçam v. Turkey that the article is in violation of the 
European Convention (see section 4.2).
The Anti-Terror Law (no. 3713), as amended in 2006, 
has restrictive provisions curtailing freedom of the 
press. Article 6(2) makes it an offence to print or 
publish declarations or leaflets of terrorist organisa-
tions, punishable by one to three years of imprison-
ment. Under Article 6(4), where such offence is 
committed through the press or the media, the 
owners and editors-in-chief of the media organ in 
question are also charged with a judicial fine equiva-
lent of up to ten thousand days. Article 6(5) allows the 
suspension of periodicals for a period of 15 days up to 
one month by court order or the prosecutor in cases 
where delay is detrimental. Article 7(2) makes it an 
offence to disseminate propaganda in favour of a 
terrorist organisation, subject to one to five years of 
imprisonment. Where such offence is committed 
through the media, the sentence is increased by half. 
The article also imposes liability to the owners and 
editors-in-chief of the press and media organs 
concerned. 
4.3  NATIONAL COURTS 
The track record of Turkish high courts in cases 
involving freedom of expression and freedom of media 
is extremely poor. In civil cases, high courts tend to go 
against the established ECtHR case law by ruling in 
favour of plaintiffs who bring defamation cases 
against intellectuals and public personalities. In 
March 2011, the High Court of Appeals sentenced 
Nobel laureate Orhan Pamuk to pay around a 2,500 
High level officials, including the Prime Minister, brought 
defamation cases against journalists criticising the 
government. 
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30 media employees are on trial for terrorism related 
charges (Gülcan, 2012). As of 26 April 2012, the number 
of imprisoned journalists had decreased to 101 (Kaya 
and Altan, 2012).
The Turkish Constitutional Court’s case law on 
freedom of the press and expression is also problem-
atic. The Court has declined to review restrictive 
criminal laws, even when the head of the executive 
branch has called on it to do so. In a case brought by 
the former President Ahmet Necdet Sezer on the 
grounds that the suspension of the future publications 
and distribution of a periodical infringed upon 
freedom of the press, the Constitutional Court found 
Article 6(5) of the Anti-Terror Law to be compatible 
with the constitution and rejected the request for 
annulment (Constitutional Court, 2009). Where the 
parliament adopted progressive legal reforms in 
accordance with the ECHR standards, on the other 
hand, the Constitutional Court overturned such 
changes. On 2 May 2011, the Constitutional Court 
invalidated Article 26 of the Press Law, which imposes 
time limits on prosecutors for launching criminal 
cases. Once this decision enters into force in July 2012, 
prosecutors will no longer be bound to certain time 
restraints if they want to file a case about a publica-
tion in a periodical. Currently, the maximum period for 
filing a case is two months after publication for dailies 
and four months for weeklies.
Pre-trial detention is very long in Turkey. Journalists, 
like other defendants, are detained on remand for 
such lengthy periods that detention time turns into 
punishment. Journalists are often convicted for 
multiple offences with extremely heavy sentences, 
facing life sentences without parole.52 In 2010, 33 
52 The detention on remand and conviction of journalists are 
not new phenomena in Turkey. In the 1990s, scores of 
Euro fine for having ‘violated the personalities’ of 
plaintiffs for having stated in an interview that the 
Turks ‘killed 30,000 Kurds and one million Armenians.’ 
The judgment raised deep concerns that it would open 
the gate to a flood of defamation cases against Pamuk 
and any others who express opinions contradicting 
Turkey’s official narrative on the Kurdish question and 
the Armenian genocide. 
In criminal cases, too, high courts are heavy-handed 
against individuals who are convicted for merely 
expressing non-violent dissenting opinions and/or 
reporting on political issues deemed to be ‘against 
state interests.’ While ‘prosecutors appear to exercise 
little restraint in filing criminal cases, including clearly 
unmeritorious cases’ (Hammarberg, 2011: para.50), 
judges do not sufficiently scrutinize whether cases 
have sufficient merit but readily issue admissibility 
decisions. Courts loosely interpret the Anti-Terror Law 
and the Penal Code in convicting individuals who 
express non-violent opinions on the situation of the 
Kurdish minority or the armed conflict between the 
army and the PKK (Hammarberg, 2011: para.20). They 
show an extreme reluctance to draw a distinction 
between reporting on terrorism and terrorist propa-
ganda, regarding instead ‘media outlets reporting 
about sensitive issues ... as the publishing organs of 
illegal organizations’ (OSCE, 2011). Consequently, 
journalists are routinely prosecuted on charges of 
terrorism and treated as ‘terrorists’ simply for having 
performed their duties to provide the public with 
information. As of the end of 2011, 104 journalists and 
additional 30 media employees were imprisoned. Of 
these 64 and 29 respectively, are members of the 
Kurdish media. All but one of the 104 journalists and 
Journalists are routinely prosecuted on charges of terrorism 
and treated as ‘terrorists’ simply for having performed 
their duties to provide the public with information. 
High courts are heavy-handed against 
individuals who are convicted for merely 
expressing non-violent dissenting opinions 
and/or reporting on political issues deemed to 
be ‘against state interests.’
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individuals were sentenced to a total of 365 years of 
imprisonment under the Anti-Terror Law (BIA, 2010: 1). 
Dozens of journalists have been convicted under this 
law, whose sentencing decisions are on appeal.53 The 
editor-in-chief of the Kurdish-language daily Azadiya 
Welat was sentenced to 166 years of imprisonment. 
These sanctions were imposed notwithstanding a 
ECtHR judgment which found the suspending of 
future publications of periodicals, whose content 
remained to be seen, to be in violation of the Euro-
pean Convention and called upon the government to 
revise Article 6(5) of the Anti-Terror Law. Drawing 
attention to the gap between the ECtHR case law and 
the judgments of national courts, the CoE Commis-
sioner for Human Rights stated that ‘there is no 
indication that domestic courts, when deciding on 
freedom of expression cases, systematically assess 
whether the content of journalistic reporting is true, 
and if so, whether the public has a legitimate interest 
in and a right to obtain the information in question 
(the so-called defences of truth and public interest)’ 
(Hammarberg, 2011: para.37).
Perhaps no other criminal case launched against 
journalists has resulted in as strong a reaction as the 
detention in March 2011 of journalists Nedim Şener 
and Ahmet Şık on charges of ‘incitement to hatred and 
journalists, particularly from the pro-Kurdish and left 
wing dissident media, were imprisoned for their r writing 
and journalistic work. Governments of the 1990s, to a 
certain extent like the current government, tried to 
alleviate the ‘problem’ through temporary solutions such 
as conditional amnesty laws rather than structural 
changes aiming at enhancing media freedom. One 
journalist who was released in such way was Ocak Işık 
Yurtçu, the editor of pro-Kurdish daily Özgür Gündem. The 
‘1990s phenomenon’ was reminded to the authors by Erol 
Önderoğlu, who also brought to their attention the case 
of Yurtçu.  
53 Among these are Cengiz Kapmaz, Hakan Tahmaz, İlkem 
Ezgi Aşam, İrfan Aktan, Merve Erol, Ragıp Zarakolu and 
Sebati Karakurt. Contribution of Erol Önderoğlu. 
animosity’54 and ‘membership of a terrorist organiza-
tion.’ While, prior to this incident, hundreds of 
journalists working in media associated with the 
Kurdish and revolutionary left movements had been 
prosecuted, the detention of these two renowned 
investigative journalists working for the mainstream 
media led to an unprecedented public debate around 
a criminal case involving the media in Turkey. The 
incident has not only given rise to protests by 
different segments of the media and society, but also 
shattered the public’s faith in the Ergenekon case. The 
subsequent confiscation by the police of the unpub-
lished manuscripts of Ahmet Şık’s book55 has further 
intensified the debate on media freedom. The CoE 
Commissioner for Human Rights expressed deep 
concern ‘about the decision of the prosecutors and 
courts to seize copies of an unpublished manuscript, 
which has serious chilling effects on freedom of 
expression, of the press and of publication’ (Hammar-
berg, 2011: para.49). As a result of intense national 
and international campaigns, Ahmet Şık, Nedim Şener 
and two other journalists were released on 12 March 
2012. The case against them continues and dozens of 
journalists remain in detention on remand.
The cases brought against journalists drew fierce 
criticism from the international community. Various 
international organizations such as the Organization 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE),56 the 
European Federation of Journalists57 and the CoE  
54 This charge was subsequently dropped. Currently, the two 
journalists are solely charged with ‘membership to the 
Ergenekon terrorist organization.’
55 Titled İmamın Ordusu (The Army of the İmam), the book is 
about the alleged links between the Fethullah Gülen 
movement and the police in Turkey.
56 On 4 April 2011, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of 
the Media made a written statement, calling upon Turkish 
authorities to bring the regulations governing journalism 
in line with the OSCE’s standards on media freedom 
(OSCE, Statement, 2011).  The annex of the statement 
contained the names of 57 imprisoned journalists (OSCE, 
Annex, 2011).
57 The European Federation for Journalists launched a 
campaign titled ‘Set Turkish Journalists Free,’ available 
at:  http://europe.ifj.org/fr/pages/turkey-campaign-set-
journalists-free (date accessed 21 November 2011).
The editor-in-chief of the Kurdish-language daily Azadiya 
Welat was sentenced to 166 years of imprisonment. 
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4.4  THE ECTHR ON MEDIA FREEDOM IN 
TURKEY
The obstacles to media freedom stemming from the 
Broadcasting Law (no. 3984) were raised for the first 
time before the ECtHR in the case of Özgür Radyo.58 
The ECtHR found that the warnings and license 
suspensions imposed by RTÜK violated Article 10. The 
Court stated that the statements at issue did not 
incite violence or hatred but covered questions of 
general interest that had already been published by 
other media without being prosecuted. This judgment 
did not prevent RTÜK from issuing similar sanctions. 
In October 2010, the ECtHR found such a sanction to 
be arbitrary and in violation of freedom of the press.59 
Recently, the ECtHR’s judgments have had some 
positive impact on media content regulation. The new 
Broadcasting Law (no. 6112) increased the legal 
threshold for the suspension of broadcasting, intro-
ducing monetary fines instead, and making the fine 
proportional to the size of the company. However, as 
discussed earlier, the new law maintains more or less 
the same subjective, unclear and open grounds for 
sanctioning broadcasters, on the basis of which RTÜK 
continues to operate. 
The vast majority of cases on media freedom and 
freedom of expression brought to the ECtHR are 
decisions based on the Penal Code and the Anti-Terror 
Law. In the case of Ürper and Others, the Court 
scrutinised Article 6(5) of the Anti-Terror Law,60 
concluding that the banning of the future publication 
of entire newspapers, whose content was yet un-
known, had a chilling effect on applicants, dissuading 
them from publishing similar news in the future, and 
thus constituted censorship. The ECtHR issued a 
58 ECtHR, Özgür Radyo-Ses Radyo Televizyon Yayın Yapım ve 
Tanıtım A.Ş. v. Turkey (no. 64178/00, 64179/00, 64181/00, 
64183/00, 64184/00), 30 June 2006.
59 ECtHR, Nur Radyo ve Televizyon Yayıncılığı A.Ş. v. Turkey 
(no. 42284/05), 12 October 2010.
60 ECtHR, Ürper and Others v. Turkey (nos. 14526/07, 14747/07, 
15022/07, 15737/07, 36137/07, 47245/07, 50371/07, 50372/07 
and 54637/07), 20 October 2009.
(Hammarberg, 2011) pointed out the gravity of the 
situation and called on the government to take the 
requisite measures to ensure press freedom. The 
European Parliament issued a very critical report on 9 
March 2011, naming cases against journalists as ‘police 
or judicial harassment’ and expressing concern about 
‘the deterioration in freedom of the press, about certain 
acts of censorship and about growing self-censorship 
within the Turkish media, including on the Internet’ 
(European Parliament, 2011: para.8). The Turkish Prime 
Minister rebuked the report as biased and subjective, 
stating that the imprisoned journalists were behind the 
bars not because of their journalistic activities but 
‘because of their relations with terrorist organizations, 
and their attempts to topple the government.’ Prime 
Minister Erdoğan similarly protested RSF’s World Press 
Freedom Index, which ranked Turkey 148th among 179 
countries, as part of a campaign “run by calling police 
murderers, sexual molesters and supporters of a coup 
journalists” (BİA, 2012). Government officials frequent-
ly make such attempts to discredit imprisoned 
journalists. Most recently, in an interview with Hard 
Talk broadcasted on BBC, Egemen Bağış, the Minister 
in Charge of EU Affairs, claimed that there is not exist a 
single journalist imprisoned for journalism and that 
those in prison were charged with crimes such as “rape, 
murder and robbery” (Söylemez, 2012).    
In addition to prosecuting journalists, courts routinely 
issue criminal sanctions against newspapers, despite 
ECtHR rulings. In 2010 alone, the Kurdish language 
daily Azadiya Welat was suspended thrice for one 
month periods each time. On 24 March 2012, a high 
penal court issued a one-month suspension order 
against the pro-Kurdish daily Özgür Gündem for having 
made the propaganda of the terrorist organization. 
The judgment provoked such a strong public reaction 
that the same court reversed its decision a few days 
later.  
The cases brought against journalists drew 
fierce criticism from the international 
community. 
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similar judgment in the case of Turgay and Others.61 
The ECtHR also took note of the fact that the Consti-
tutional Court of Turkey had not taken into account 
the Ürper and Others judgment in its jurisprudence on 
media freedom. Concerning paragraph 2 of Article 6, 
the ECtHR held that the applicants’ criminal convic-
tion for having published statements of illegal 
organisations and their members violated Article 10 of 
the Convention.62 
Two recent ECtHR decisions in particular caused major 
embarrassment for the Turkish government, which 
had argued that the amended version of Article 301 
would prevent arbitrary prosecutions for non-violent 
opinions. In the case of Dink v. Turkey, the Court found 
a violation of Article 10 on account of Hrant Dink’s 
conviction for ‘insulting Turkishness’ in his article 
published in the Armenian-Turkish weekly Agos.63 Dink 
was an Armenian journalist who was portrayed as an 
enemy of the Turks and turned into an object of hatred 
by the national media on account of his conviction and 
who was subsequently assassinated. The murder of 
Dink created such a strong protest that the govern-
ment was compelled to amend (but not abolish) 
Article 301, requiring prior written authorization by 
the Minister of Justice for the launch of a case. This 
amendment, too, failed to prevent further defeat in 
Strasbourg. On 25 October 2011, in the case of Akçam v. 
Turkey, the ECtHR held that ‘the safeguards put in 
place by the legislator to prevent the abusive applica-
tion of Article 301 by the judiciary do not provide a 
61 ECtHR, Turgay and Others v. Turkey (no. 8306/08, 8340/08 
and 8366/08), 15 June 2010.
62 ECtHR, Gözel and Özer v. Turkey (no. 43453/04 and 
31098/05), 6 July 2010.
63 ECtHR, Dink v. Turkey (no. 2668/07, 6102/08, 30079/08, 
7072/09 and 7124/09), 14 September 2010.
reliable and continuous guarantee or remove the risk 
of being directly affected by the provision because any 
political change in time might affect the interpretative 
attitudes of the Ministry of Justice and open the way 
for arbitrary prosecutions.’64 The Court found not only 
the applicant’s prosecution under Article 301, but also 
the article itself to have violated Article 10 of the 
European Convention. 
The ECtHR also addressed the defamation cases 
brought against journalists. In its judgment dated 21 
February 2012 in the case of Tuşalp v. Turkey, the Court 
held that the sentencing of a journalist to pay 5,000 TL 
(around 2,000 Euros) in compensation for having 
attacked Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan’s personal 
rights violated Article 10 of the Convention.65 In 
finding that the criticisms did not constitute a 
personal attack against the Prime Minister, the Court 
reiterated that “the press fulfils an essential function 
in a democratic society” and that the parameters of 
acceptable criticism are broader as regards to 
politicians. According to the ECtHR, journalistic 
freedom also extends to “a degree of exaggeration, or 
even provocation” and the Prime Minister “was 
obliged to display a greater degree of tolerance.” The 
Court also pointed out the significant amount of 
compensation that the applicant was ordered to pay, 
which “could deter others from criticising public 
officials.” 
The ECtHR’s judgments in Gözel and Özer, Dink and 
Akçam, which concerned criminal convictions based on 
the amended version of the Penal Code (in 2005) and 
64 ECtHR, Taner Akçam v. Turkey (no. 27520/07), 25 October 
2011, para. 94.
65 ECtHR, Tuşalp v. Turkey (no. 32131/08 and 41617/08), 21 
February 2012.
Two recent ECtHR decisions caused embarrassment for 
the government, which had argued that the amended 
version of Article 301 would prevent arbitrary prosecutions 
for non-violent opinions. 
According to the ECtHR, journalistic freedom 
also extends to “a degree of exaggeration, or 
even provocation” and the Prime Minister 
“was obliged to display a greater degree of 
tolerance.”
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decide on the continuation of detentions ‘on the basis 
of cliché’ remarks which do not provide sufficient 
reasoning (Karaca, 2011). 
the Anti-Terror Law (in 2006), validated the concern 
voiced on many occasions by the domestic and 
international human rights community that the 
reforms ‘have kept the contents of the former texts 
largely intact’ (Hammarberg, 2011: para.15). More 
recently, an unconventionally bold criticism by an 
ECtHR judge, and the Turkish judge on the bench no 
less, caused the government major diplomatic 
embarrassment. In an interview to Turkish press, 
Judge Işıl Karakaş stated that Turkey has the worst 
record on freedom of the press and freedom of 
expression among all members of the CoE (Karaca, 
2011). Pointing out that the ECtHR found violations in 
more than 200 cases against Turkey, as opposed to 10 
in the case of France, Judge Karakaş particularly drew 
attention to Article 6(2) and (5) of the Anti-Terror Law 
and Article 301 of the Penal Code as in violation of the 
European Convention and explicitly called for the 
abolishment of Article 301.    
The persistence of the Turkish judiciary to disregard 
the ECHR standards and the ECtHR’s case law 
(Kurban, et al., 2008) shows that the infringement of 
freedom of press and expression in Turkey do not only 
stem from anti-democratic laws, but also from the 
entrenched understandings of judges and prosecu-
tors.66 Making reference to his observation that 
‘prosecutors and courts in Turkey often perceive 
dissidence and criticism, as well as the expression of 
minority identities, primarily as a threat to the 
integrity of the state,’ the CoE Commissioner for 
Human Rights stated that in ‘the absence of a drastic 
shift in the adjudicative approach of the judiciary,’ 
legal reforms will not be sufficient to ensure the 
protection of freedom of press (Hammarberg, 2011: 
para.39). A similar point was also made by Judge 
Karakaş of the ECtHR, who emphasized that long 
periods of pre-trial detention was not just a problem 
stemming from the laws but also from judges who 
66 A research study based on in depth interviews with judges 
and prosecutors of first degree courts reveals how 
prevalent the statist mentality can be among members of 
the legal profession (Sancar and Ümit, 2009). 
The persistence of the Turkish judiciary to disregard the 
ECHR standards shows that the infringement of freedom 
of press and expression also stem from the entrenched 
understandings of judges and prosecutors.
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ships between media patrons and the state, whereby 
the former began to exert pressure on politicians to 
maximize their profits in their other activity areas 
using their media outlets (Christensen, 2007: 185). At 
the same time, while media owners competed with 
each other financially, they by and large shared a 
common mindset which rested on protecting the 
‘state interest.’ 
5.1   POLITICAL PRESSURE, PATRONAGE 
AND SELF-CENSORSHIP
The most important political consequence of this new 
media structure was the ‘post-modern military coup’ 
of 28 February 1997, which many consider to be the 
fourth instance of military intervention in Turkey. 
Mainstream media organisations, prompted by 
Turkey’s military establishment, published fictitious 
news/content on the rise of Islamism. Cengiz Çandar 
and Mehmet Ali Birand, two renowned journalists 
working for a mainstream media organ, also became 
targets of the fictitious news leaked by the army chief 
of staff which alleged that they were on the payroll of 
the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Kerkerên 
Kurdistan- PKK). Based on false documents fabricated 
by Çevik Bir, the general who was then the second in 
command of the chief of staff, allegedly quoted from 
the testimony of a PKK militant turned- informant, 
both journalists were labelled as ‘PKK agents’ by the 
mainstream media, who did not feel the need to verify 
From the beginning, Turkish journalists played a 
significant role in the modernization of the Ottoman 
Empire and the foundation of the Republic. The press 
has also consistently been the potential target of 
state/government repression or pressure (Elmas and 
Kurban, 2011). During the early years of the republic, 
opponent journalists were prosecuted by the Inde-
pendence Courts (İstiklâl Mahkemeleri) and most of 
them were exiled. During the single party regime until 
1950, the conflict between the ‘opponent’ (Istanbul) 
and ‘proponent’ (Ankara) press emanated from 
different approaches to the political regime. While 
journalists obtained some social rights via a liberal 
press law adopted during the first years of the 
multiparty regime, the honeymoon soon ended with 
the censorship policies of the government. Although 
the first coup d’état provided a truly liberal amend-
ment to the Labour Law (no. 5953) in favour of 
journalists – and despite the protests of press owners 
- each and every coup of 1960, 1971 and 1980 was 
followed by a period of military rule, which had 
significant repercussions for media freedom. 
The true shift in the journalistic profession came at 
the beginning of the 1980s through the new ownership 
structure. Traditional family-owned media ownership 
was replaced by new investors who already operated 
in other industries of the economy. The new owners of 
the Turkish press gradually carried the ‘corporate 
mentality’ to their media operations. Also due to the 
politically authoritarian post-coup d’état climate, the 
commercialization of the media ended with an 
increase in the sensationalisation and tabloidization 
of the press (Bek, 2004). 
The deregulation of the media markets in the 1990s 
resulted in the development of ‘clientalist’ relation-
While media owners competed with each other financially, 
they by and large shared a common mindset which rested 
on protecting the ‘state interest.’ 
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the information leaked from the military. First Birand 
and some years later Çandar were fired from the 
national daily Sabah by their media owners, while a 
leading human rights activist also branded as a PKK 
agent survived an assassination attempt (Elmas and 
Kurban, 2011).
The patronage relationship, or the “vicious triangle” 
(Alpay, 2010) of media conglomerates, politicians and 
businessmen67 also laid the ground for the 2001 
financial crisis through widespread corruptions in the 
banking sector. In late 1990s, the most flagrant 
example of using the media for business gains and 
political interest was the case of Cem Uzan, one of the 
leading media owners at the time. Uzan mobilized his 
eight television and radio stations and two newspa-
pers to support his nationalist Youth Party during the 
2002 national elections (Alpay, 2010). After the 
financial crisis which forced some of the corporations 
that had investments in both the financial and media 
sectors to withdraw from the market, groups manag-
ing to remain in the media sector got stronger while 
enterprises belonging to those wiped out of the 
system were transferred to TMSF and in time sold 
through tenders.
When AK Party came to power in 2002, the media 
owners initially supported the new government. This 
positive atmosphere largely eroded after AK Party’s 
second electoral victory in 2004. The collaborative 
attempts of a group of political elites and media 
owners to bring an end to AK Party’s power caused 
irreversible conflicts between the government and the 
media. The fall out was particularly visible in the 
largest media group’s (Doğan Group) opposition to 
the government reform packages. Most strikingly, on 
10 February 2008, the constitutional amendment 
adopted by the parliament to legalize the headscarf at 
universities was covered by Hürriyet, the biggest 
67 The information recently revealed by the criminal 
investigations into the February 28th process indicates 
that the military was also a part of the coalition that 
Alpay refers to and has engaged in ‘rampant corruptions’ 
in the period running up to the 2001 financial crisis.   
Turkish daily with the headline ‘411 hands rose to 
chaos,’ referring to the number of parliamentarians 
who voted in favour. Hürriyet was also instrumental in 
generating public opinion in favour of mass demon-
strations in the name of protecting secularism against 
the government, which were later found to be 
co-organized by groups involving retired high rank 
military leaders. In response, the AK Party govern-
ment developed a dual strategy to eliminate media 
opposition. On one hand, it forced the Doğan Group to 
downsize its media investments by introducing 
disproportionately heavy fines for tax fraud. On the 
other hand, the government reconfigured the 
mainstream media. In 2007, the second largest media 
group was bought by Çalık Holding, which has close 
ties to the government, thanks to credits provided by 
two major public banks. The chairman of the board of 
this group is the son-in-law of the Prime Minister. 
Thus, the power shifted from opponent mainstream 
media companies to ‘reconfigured’ or ‘proponent’ 
media companies. Some analysts argue that AKP’s 
coming to power was a milestone for the media in 
Turkey, which needs to be analyzed in accordance with 
a pre and post AKP comparison. Others, however, 
believe that the current situation where most media is 
named as ‘pro-government’ is an inevitable outcome 
of the 2001 crisis, which resulted in the withdrawal of 
the financial sector from the media and the entry of 
new capital to fill the gap.68 
As experienced journalist Ragıp Duran suggested, the 
media which formerly wore the (invisible) ‘epaulette’ 
henceforth became ‘green,’ shifting from a pro-mili-
tary to a pro-Islamist government position (Duran, 
2011). To illustrate this change, Duran refers to the 
meeting the Prime Minister convened in October 2011 
68 Minutes of the workshop on the topic of ‘Media and 
Democratisation’ Istanbul, 08/10/2010.
In response, the AK Party government 
developed a dual strategy to eliminate media 
opposition.
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(Duran, 2012). The advertising pressure prevents the 
media from reporting on corruptions, dismissals, 
strikes or non-unionization in the financial sector. 
On the other hand, the media owners’ preoccupation 
with keeping good relations with the state has been 
more decisive in self-censorship in comparison with 
direct threats facing journalists. The most salient 
example of this phenomenon emerged after the death 
of 34 Kurdish civilians who were bombed by military 
fighter jets in the Uludere / Roboski village of the 
Hakkari province at the end of 2011. The victims were 
villagers engaged in cross-border smuggling who were 
reportedly mistaken as PKK militants. The main-
stream media did not cover the massacre in the first 18 
hours and released their first coverage only after the 
government issued a press statement. By that time, 
the public opinion was already informed about the 
incident through the Kurdish news sources and the 
social media, in particular Twitter. This incident 
shattered the reliability of the mass mediain the 
dissemination of news. .Similarly,the discharge of 
Banu Güven, one of the most respected and reliable 
journalists on television, following her critical 
coverage of government policies on the Kurdish issue 
demonstrated that self-censorship arose from the 
media owners’ policies rather than pressure from the 
ruling party (Tekerek, 2011). The dismissal in 2012 of a 
few other journalists and columnists71 further elevated 
the discussions on the issue. While some perceived 
the discharge of names critical of government policies 
– particularly on the Kurdish question- as evidence of 
increasing government pressure on the media, others 
argued that this was rather the consequence of 
71 Among these were Ece Temelkuran, Nuray Mert and Ruşen 
Çakır.
with the owners and executives of media organiza-
tions to beseech them to be ‘sensible’ in their cover-
age of ‘terrorism and violence incidents.’ The day after 
this meeting, the five biggest news agencies ‘Anadolu 
Agency (AA), Turkish News Agency (AHT), Ankara 
News Agency (ANKA), Cihan News Agency (CİHAN) 
and İhlas News Agency (İHA) announced in a joint 
statement that they were going to “comply with the 
publication bans of the competent authorities”’ 
(Söylemez, 2011b). While the incident did not receive 
sufficient critical attention domestically, RSF issued a 
statement against both the government and the 
united stand of the media patrons: “We had hoped 
that the era of government directives telling the 
media how to cover the most sensitive subjects was 
long over in Turkey. The very vaguely formulated 
undertaking by the leading news agencies to toe the 
official line now poses a serious threat to freedom of 
information.”69   
The shifting power influenced not only the ownership 
structure, but albeit indirectly also editorial policies 
and increased self-censorship. Thereby, as pointed 
out by a journalist, the media ownership structure in 
Turkey presents an obstacle to media diversity and 
pluralism: ‘when I look at the newspapers in the 
morning, I see two groups. The media has established 
such a monopoly that it does not cover any news 
about social and environmental or world affairs.’70 
These concerns also apply to the coverage of econom-
ic news. It is not possible to read any negative 
coverage regarding the biggest 10 companies in Turkey 
69 http://en.rsf.org/turkey-journalists-under-pressure-
as-26-10-2011,41282.html.
70 Minutes of the workshop on the topic of ‘Media and 
Democratisation’ Istanbul, 08/10/2010.
The shifting power influenced not only the 
ownership structure, but also editorial policies 
and increased self-censorship. 
The media owners’ preoccupation with keeping good 
relations with the state has been more decisive in self-
censorship in comparison with direct threats facing 
journalists. 
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self-censorship on the part of media owners. Others 
pointed out that the discharge of dissident journalists 
is an established phenomenon in Turkey, criticizing 
the coverage of the issue only when popular media 
figures are targeted. 
Arguably, it is the government’s pressure on media 
groups, such as the disproportionate tax fines 
imposed on the Doğan Media Group that causes such 
self-censorship. The Prime Minister Erdoğan’s plea to 
media owners to keep under control or otherwise 
dismiss columnists for their negative press coverage 
of the government’s fiscal policies –on the grounds 
that their distorted portrayals would serve to 
de-stabilise the economy- is another instance of such 
pressure (Duran, 2010). However, today, as in the past, 
it is the involvement of the media patrons in other 
sectors of the economy that makes them susceptible 
to such pressure and financially reliant on the 
government, which in turn leads them to pressure 
journalists to refrain from negative coverage of the 
government. 
A recent survey shows that a very high percentage of 
journalists in Turkey believe that there is censorship 
and self-censorship in the media. Respondents 
express the fear that ‘they might be taken to court for 
the content of their articles’ and feel intimidated by 
pressure from the government and media patrons 
(Arsan, 2011). On the other hand, journalists have 
always worked under intense legal and political 
pressure in Turkey. As seasoned journalist Alper 
Görmüş72 reminded with respect to its owner’s closure 
of weekly Nokta after the initiation of a criminal case 
72 Alper Görmüş prepared a series on editorial independence 
in the media in Turkey including debates between other 
journalists, Taraf, available at: http://www.taraf.com.tr/
alper-gormus/makale-lafla-editoryal-bagimsizlik-gemisi-
yurumez-1.htm (date accessed 11 November 2011).
at military courts,73 journalists are afraid to lose the 
‘privileged’ economic and political position afforded to 
them by the media. According to Görmüş, self-censor-
ship results not from government pressure but from 
the unwillingness of media executives, columnists and 
editors to risk their careers and high incomes. On the 
other hand, criminal cases launched against media 
organs and journalists reporting on sensitive political 
issues not only cause the media to censor itself, but 
also constitutes firsthand censorship. Indeed, the 
daily Taraf  has faced about 300 criminal cases 
launched against its owner, editors and journalists as 
of July 2011.74 
The practice of accreditation, namely the restriction of 
access to official press meetings to select media 
organs could also be regarded as state censorship. 
Most recently,the dailies Taraf, Zaman, Bugün, Yeni 
Akit and Birgün, the news agency Cihan and the 
television channels Samanyolu TV, Samanyolu Haber 
TV, Kanal 7, Bugün TV, Kanaltürk TV and Ülke TV were 
denied accreditation by the military to cover the 
funeral ceremony for 12 soldiers who had died in 
Afghanistan (Agos, 2012). The selective dissemination 
of press card by the Directorate General of Press and 
Information of the Office of the Prime Ministry also 
constitutes a form of accreditation.  In many countries, 
this process is undertaken by industry associations, 
trades unions, and professional associations.  
5.2  MEDIA ETHICS AND SELF-
REGULATION
The tabloidization of news and violations of profes-
sional rules of ethics through inconsistent and even 
fictitious news in the Turkish media are the outcomes 
of ‘the industry’s fierce competition in the ratings 
“war”’ (Bek, 2004). The ideological polarizations and 
political divisions within and among various media 
and journalists’ associations prevent them from 
73 For more on the incidents leading to the closure of Nokta, 
see Elmas and Kurban, 47- 48.
74 Interview with Markar Esayan,Vice Chief Editor of  daily 
Taraf , by Ceren Sözeri, Istanbul, 12/07/2011.
The practice of accreditation, could also be regarded as 
state censorship.
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newspaper (Baydar, 2011: 96). Currently, three Turkish 
newspapers (Sabah, Star and Milliyet) have active 
ombudsmen who (self) monitor the compliance of 
their paper with codes of journalistic ethics. The 
website editions are exempt from the ombudsmen’s 
mandate. While the ombudsman institution is seen as 
a potentially important monitoring force for the media, 
many doubt its effectiveness in a culture which does 
not tolerate criticism. In September 2006, RTÜK 
introduced a voluntary ombudsman mechanism for 
broadcasters. Currently, 34 national and local 
television channels have ‘audience representatives,’ 
whose contact information is listed on RTÜK’s 
website.
The new technologies offer new opportunities to 
access alternative sources of information beyond the 
mainstream media. One of the most significant 
examples of such sources is the Independent Commu-
nication Network (Bağımsız İletişim Ağı- BİA), which 
was established in 1997 for monitoring and covering 
media freedom and promoting independent journal-
ism in Turkey. Funded by European institutions such 
as the EU Media Fund and the Swedish International 
Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), BİA gives 
training to journalists, communication students and 
NGOs; publishes handbooks on peace journalism; 
broadcasts radio programs for the local media; 
organizes conferences, forums and international 
exchange programs. Besides BİA and a handful of 
other successful examples, however, many of the 
online news media outlets release ‘copy-paste’ 
content from news agencies or the mainstream media. 
The government’s recent attempts to extend the Press 
Law to the online media and to issue press cards for 
journalists working for online media raised serious 
concerns regarding freedom of the press. The 
Alternative Informatics Association launched the 
‘internet needs freedom, not press cards’ campaign, 
criticizing the government’s initiative as an attempt of 
censorship and control of the media (Alternatif Bilişim 
Derneği, 2011).
engaging in collaborative efforts to develop rules of 
self-regulation.  The Press Council (Basın Konseyi), 
which was established by a group of journalists in 
1986 and supported by media owners as well. It 
developed its own charter, which was most recently 
amended in 2003. From the outset, the independence 
of this body from the state and official ideology has 
been highly contested by members of the profession. 
Currently, the Press Council ‘accounts to very few 
newspapers and does not enjoy significant respect 
among the media community’ (Zlatev, 2011: 36). Most 
recently, a number of key representatives including 
those from TRT and the Anatolian News Agency 
(official news agency of Turkey) withdrew from the 
council following a vote of confidence in November 
2011 to keep Oktay Ekşi as its chairman. What has 
made Ekşi’s endorsement controversial was the fact 
that he had recently resigned from this post to run in 
the general elections as an MP candidate. 
The 1998 Declaration of Rights and Responsibilities 
developed by the Journalists Association of Turkey 
(Türkiye Gazeteciler Cemiyeti) is the most referred 
source on ethical codes for journalism. Recently, a 
group of journalists who parted their way with the 
Press Council established the Media Association 
(Medya Derneği) to support and raise the standards of 
the media. In 2011, the association announced a new 
code of ethics for journalists, which was developed 
during a three-day Media Ethics Workshop held in 
January of the same year.
The first print news ombudsman of Turkey was 
initiated in 1999 by the daily Milliyet. The initiative 
ended in a ‘car crash’ when the ombudsman was 
dismissed following his refusal to bow down to the 
management’s pressure to refrain from publishing a 
critical piece about the fabrication of facts in the 
The ideological polarizations and political 
divisions within the media prevent 
collaborative efforts to develop rules of 
self-regulation. 
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5.3  THE WORKING CONDITIONS OF 
JOURNALISTS 
Labour relations in the media have been regulated by 
Law no. 5953 (commonly known as ‘212’ because of 
number of amendments) on the Regulation of the 
Employee-Employer Relations in the Journalism 
Profession in the Turkish Media Industry since 1952. 
However, despite the special rights granted to journal-
ists by this law, for long years journalists have been 
employed without social security and under provisions 
of the Labour Law instead of the Law no. 5953.  
It cannot be denied that the vulnerable position of 
journalists vis-à-vis their patrons or the state is at the 
same time the result of the absence of horizontal 
solidarity in the media. At the beginning of the 1990s, 
the new media owners forced journalists to make a 
choice between their labour union memberships and 
their jobs (Tılıç, 2000). Commenting on the obstacles 
to unionization, a labour union representative stated 
that as soon as employers find out about their union-
ized employees, they pressure them to quit the union. 
He added that their members who were dismissed due 
to their union activities cannot find a job in the sector. 
Journalists lack effective strategies to combat wage 
exploitation and unlawful dismissals. The financial 
crisis of 2001, which resulted in the dismissal of about 
5,000 journalists (Söylemez, 2011) working in media 
groups that had investments in the banking sector, has 
further exacerbated these fears. Few dare to bring a 
lawsuit against their former employers for fear of not 
being able to find a job in the sector. The existence of a 
‘gentlemen’s agreement’ among media companies not 
to hire journalists others have fired is widely comment-
ed on. The experience of Ahmet Şık, who was arrested 
as part of the Ergenekon cases a couple of months after 
he attended our workshop, is one of the most well 
known examples of this phenomenon. After having 
being dismissed in 2005 - on the World Press Freedom 
Day - from a newspaper belonging to the Doğan media 
group for his union activities, Şık could not find job in 
the sector for a long time. His employers had told him 
to quit the union and threatened that, if not, he would 
be dismissed and would not find a job elsewhere.  
Where journalists do go to court, cases take too long: ‘I 
file a case, it ends in six years!’ Recent strikes at the 
daily Sabah and ATV television station failed due to 
suppressions of the employer and also lack of solidarity. 
Nine of the ten journalists who participated in the 
strike were dismissed from their jobs and the last one 
subsequently resigned to save his indemnity (Cinmen 
2011, Ergün, 2011; and Tılıç 2011). Today, according to the 
data of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, the 
Turkish Journalists Union has 4,550 members; and the 
rate of unionization in the journalism sector is 28.9 per 
cent. However, it is hard to say that these numbers are 
accurate since as not all of these memberships are 
active (Tulgar, 2006). Moreover, it can be said that 
unionisation rate decreased further in 2012, after the 
recent non-unionization process in Anadolu Agency 
(AA) which the head of Turkish Journalists Union 
protested with a hunger strike, (BİA, 2012a).
Conducting research on labour relations in the Turkish 
media sector is a difficult endeavour, owing not only 
to the informality of employment practices, but also 
the scarcity and inaccessibility of data. Research 
conducted for this report shows that a very high 
number of media employees lack social security 
benefits; journalists are forced to frequently change 
jobs, resulting in high employee turnover rates in the 
sector; and media companies are reluctant to pursue a 
transparent policy when it comes to labour relations. 
According to the data of Social Security Institution of 
Turkey (Sosyal Güvenlik Kurumu- SGK), a large majority 
of the employees in the media sector have an average 
seniority of less than five years.75 
75 The data derived from SGK according to classifications 
included the media sector in the NACE (Nomenclature 
Générale des Activités Economiques dans les Communautés 
Européennes), the system used for statistical classification 
of economic activities in the EU countries.
The vulnerable position of journalists vis-à-vis their patrons 
or the state is at the same time the result of the absence of 
horizontal solidarity in the media. 
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The sector-based findings of the 2009 Household 
Labour Force Survey of Turkish Statistical Institute 
(TURKSTAT) confirm SGK data.76 Accordingly, the 
average seniority of employees working in large media 
groups in Turkey is five years. This drops down to one 
year for employees working without social security 
benefits. Journalists formally employed in the media 
work for an average of 50 hours a week, while 70 per 
cent of the informal employees work for an average of 
40. In rare occasions, the government inspects 
whether media companies hire employees without 
social security insurance, as in the case of the inspec-
tion of the Doğan Media Group in 2010. While union 
representatives find regular inspections to every 
media company –in addition to the legal protection of 
the right to association and the penalization of 
employers who arbitrarily dismiss journalists for their 
union activities- to be an effective mechanism,77 others 
76 In an attempt to collect data on working conditions in 
large media groups in Turkey, we analyzed the survey 
results from companies employing 250 or more employees 
(a total of 100 surveys).
77 Labour union representative, minutes of the workshop on 
the topic of ‘Human Resources Problems and the Future of 
the Media Sector’, Ankara, 18/12/2010.
point out that the selective nature of inspections, 
which do not target pro-government media, which 
also violate the labour law.78 Union representatives 
point out that even the public broadcaster TRT is 
engaged in informal employment practices.79   
TURKSTAT survey also includes data on the wages 
earned by employees in the media sector. The highest 
monthly salary declared is 35 thousand TL (15 thousand 
EUR), while 25 per cent of the respondents reported 
they work for less than 1,000 TL (418 EUR) per month. 
The average monthly salary among the formally 
employed is 1,250 TL (521 EUR). While 25 per cent of 
those informally employed work for a monthly salary of 
less than 500 TL (208 EUR), the average monthly salary 
for this group is 560 TL (233 EUR). The wage imbalance 
between the employees not only disrupts relations in 
the workplace, but also constitutes a significant 
impediment to the unionization of journalists, which in 
turn further deteriorates working conditions.
78 An editor, minutes of the workshop on the topic of ‘Human 
Resources Problems and the Future of the Media Sector’, 
Ankara, 18/12/2010.
79 ibid.
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Source: TURKSTAT Household Labour Force Surveys (2009)
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Another important factor that adversely affects the 
working and living conditions of journalists is that 
private and public media enterprises are located in big 
cities, and mostly in Istanbul, where living costs are 
extremely high compared to the rest of the country. 
The disproportionate representation of the media and 
media professionals in Istanbul also accounts for the 
underdeveloped nature of the local media in Turkey.
According to TURKSTAT statistics on print media, the 
total circulation rates of local and regional media 
were as low as 18 per cent in 2009. Local media is 
unable to employ qualified journalists, and those who 
seek to participate in labour force in the media sector 
are forced to live in big cities. This affects not only the 
working conditions of journalists but also the media 
content they produce, resulting in an Istanbul centric 
flow of news and information. 
The root cause of the poor working conditions, 
problems in organising and the imbalanced geograph-
ical distribution in the media sector is the gap 
between legal regulations and their implementation, 
as well as the economic structure of the sector. Media 
enterprises that make no profit and work under 
conditions far from economically rational survive 
solely on the resistance of their owners, who want to 
stay in the sector in order to maximize their profits in 
the other sectors they invest in. In other words, labour 
exploitation is a significant source of media subsidy in 
Turkey; a media executive stated that this situation 
creates an extraordinary pressure for cost-cutting on 
the owners.80 These conditions make issues such as 
increasing the quality of journalists and improving 
80 Minutes of the workshop on the topic of ‘Media and 
Democratisation’, Istanbul, 8/10/2010.
their working conditions81secondary, and result in 
informal employment practices which are detrimental 
for journalists. An editor working for a broadcasting 
company said the following on the lack of skilled 
journalists in the sector: ‘Nobody wants to invest in 
high quality media in Turkey. They make an effort to 
hire young, inexperienced, presentable individuals 
who are unaware of and who do not care about ethical 
aspect of the media.’82
81 For example, as of May 2012, journalists at daily Akşam 
have been made to work without salary for more than 
three months on the grounds of the financial problems of 
the owner of the newspaper (Karaca, 2012)  
82 Minutes of the workshop on the topic of ‘Human 
Resources Problems and the Future of the Media Sector’, 
Ankara, 18/12/2010.
Labour exploitation is a significant source of media subsidy 
in Turkey; a media executive stated that this situation 
creates an extraordinary pressure for cost-cutting on the 
owners.
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6. Media Literacy and Transparency 
Requirements 
According to surveys, an average adult in Turkey 
watches television for 2.8 hours a day. This number is 
6.8 hours for housewives and 2-2.5 hours for children. 
An average adult reads 0.1 newspaper every day, and 
0.02 weekly and 0.1 monthly newspapers and journals. 
S/he listens to the radio for 2.3 hours a week (Sözeri 
and Güney, 2011; RTÜK, 2006). In view of the high 
access rate of television (98 per cent) and long 
watching hours, the effects of the media particularly 
on children and young adults and the concentrated 
market structure that does not allow for pluralism, 
media literacy is considered as the core element for 
the expansion of  democratic culture in Turkey 
(İnceoğlu, 2007). 
RTÜK’s project for media literacy education in primary 
schools was extensively debated by the regulatory 
authority and academics during the First Media 
Literacy Conference in 2005. In 2006, elective media 
literacy courses started to be taught to children in the 
6th, 7th and 8th grades with the cooperation of RTÜK 
and the Ministry of National Education. A guideline 
for teachers was prepared in collaboration with the 
Board of Education and Discipline (Talim Terbiye 
Kurulu) and academics from various communication 
faculties in Turkey. 
The first research conducted on the effects of media 
literacy courses on teachers and students welcomed 
the initiative ‘which will have several positive effects 
on children’ but warned of the ‘possibility of the 
project’s failure since the classes are taught by social 
science teachers and not by specialists of communica-
tion.’ The research asserts that the question of who 
should teach these classes has been prioritized over 
how their content or methodology should be. The 
‘teachers are not aware of the difference between 
evaluation and media criticism’ (İnceoğlu, 2007). 
Teachers are reported to feel inadequate to teach 
media literacy: ‘The subject of the course is not my 
professional area. I tell the students what I know and 
what I think about the media. A media specialist 
should teach this course’ (Yazıcı, 2011). Although 
RTÜK’s director also proposed these courses should 
be taught by graduates of faculties of communication 
(IV. Kuvvet Medya, 2011), these individuals lack 
pedagogic formation and are thus unqualified to teach 
(Ajans1, 2009).
On the other hand, RTÜK’s approach to media literacy 
has also received criticism on the ground that it is 
fuelled by a protective mentality. In the guide books, 
children ‘are seen as the “most sensitive group” prone 
to media effect’ and portrayed as ‘vulnerable receivers’ 
whose consciousness on the media need to be raised. 
The courses are not designed from a pedagogical 
perspective on critical media literacy education. 
Moreover, the comments of children about the media 
after attending the media literacy program attest that 
this education introduces a conservative rather than a 
critical perspective on the media (Bek, 2011).
On the other hand, considering that media literacy is 
not only a matter of education, but also a political and 
The inability and unwillingness of the media to regulate 
itself, as well as the authoritarian and punitive nature of 
state regulation mobilized civil society to monitor the 
media’s compliance with codes of ethics.
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ideological issue and a component of social opposi-
tion, it is sometimes classified as a new social 
movement (Hepkon and Aydın, 2005). In recent years, 
there has been a growing awareness on the need for 
social monitoring of the media. The inability and 
unwillingness of the media to regulate itself, as well 
as the authoritarian and punitive nature of state 
regulation mobilized civil society to monitor the 
media’s compliance with universal principles and 
professional codes of ethics. Various nongovernmen-
tal organizations and activist groups started media 
watch initiatives in order to expand the culture of 
diversity and to reduce discrimination, racism and 
hate speech. For example, MEDİZ (Woman’s Media 
Watch Group)83 has been monitoring sexism in the 
media since 2006. The group opened the issue to 
public discussion at a conference titled ‘For a non-
sexist Media’ and published a book named End to 
Sexism in Media. KAOS GL84 regularly watches sexism 
and discrimination in the media against LGBT indi-
viduals. 
After the assassination of the Armenian journalist and 
human rights defender Hrant Dink in 2007, hate 
crimes and hate speech in the media became a 
pressing issue for civil society. The Association for 
Social Change (Sosyal Değişim Derneği)85 prepared a 
report entitled Hate Crimes in National Press: 10 years, 
10 examples and recently launched a campaign for the 
adoption of Turkey’s first anti-hate speech law. 
Similarly, the International Hrant Dink Foundation86 
combats racism and discrimination based on ethnic 
and religious grounds through media monitoring. 
83 MEDIZ [Women’s Media Watch Group], available at:  
http://www.mediz.org/Kategori/13/1/English.aspx, (date 
accessed 27 December 2011).
84 KAOS GL [LGBTT’s News Portal], available at: http://
www.kaosgl.org/category.php?id=21-0 (date accessed 27 
December 2011).
85 Sosyal Değişim Derneği [The Association for Social 
Change], available at:  http://www.nefretme.org/
hakkinda/ (date accessed 27 December 2011).
86 International Hrant Dink Foundation, Media watch on 
hate speech, available at: http://www.nefretsoylemi.org/
en/index.asp (date accessed 27 December 2011).
During a two years project funded by the European 
Commission, the Foundation analyzed 24 newspapers, 
published four monthly reports and organized 
workshops for journalists. The Human Rights Joint 
Platform (İnsan Hakları Ortak Platformu- İHOP)87 
published a report titled I am not Racist but...: Racist 
and Discriminatory Speech in the Press, which points out 
that ‘discrimination denial strategy’ is one of the most 
typical examples for discrimination in the media.
87 IHOP [Human Rights Joint Platform], available at:
 http://www.ihop.org.tr/index.php?option=com_content&
view=article&id=351&Itemid=46 (date accessed 27 
December 2011).
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7. Conclusion 
An analysis of media independence and freedom of the 
press in Turkey is not just a matter of an analysis of 
the regulatory framework governing media content 
and structure, but also calls for a critical assessment 
of media-state relationships from a historical 
perspective. From the outset, since the establishment 
of the first newspaper in late Ottoman era, the media 
in Turkey has never been independent of the state. 
Neither has the media ever had such a claim or 
aspiration. To the contrary, since its emergence, the 
press was designed as a tool of political power and 
tasked with the mission of spreading the official 
ideology to the masses. With the transition to the 
republic, the Turkish press was used by the founders 
as an effective tool in processes of state formation 
and modernization. The attempts by a minority to 
establish a truly independent and free press were 
rebuffed by the punishment of dissident media. Since 
the late 19th century, opponent journalists have been 
suppressed by state and non-state actors who 
claimed to act in the name of ‘state interests,’ evident 
in the dozens of assassinations by ‘unknown’ perpe-
trators. The transition from an authoritarian single-
party regime to a multiparty democracy in the 1950s 
did not change this fact; the press continued to be 
used by successive governments to consolidate their 
political power, be it military regimes or civilian 
governments.  
The economic liberalisation of the 1980s resulted in 
the entry of new investors into the media sector, 
resulting in substantial change in the ownership struc-
ture. The profile of media patrons changed from 
journalist families to companies which also had 
investments in other sectors. Independent newspa-
pers were replaced by companies that owned multiple 
newspapers and magazines. The ending of state 
monopoly over broadcasting in the 1990s and the 
proliferation of private broadcasters introduced the 
second wave of structural change in the sector; the 
media started to be dominated by only a handful of 
large corporations, which increased their economic 
power through vertical and horizontal mergers. The 
concentration in the media was made possible with 
the inadequacy of legal barriers to cross-mergers, as 
well as the lack of legal barriers that would prevent 
media conglomerates from participating into public 
tenders in other sectors they had investments in. The 
inadequacy of the regulatory framework to promote 
press freedom and diversity in the media has encour-
aged big corporations to see themselves as political 
actors that can bargain with the government 
(Mahçupyan, 2011). These corporations competed 
with the government for profit in sectors such as 
construction, transportation and industry. At the 
same time, media owners were extremely dependent 
on the clientelist relations with the state which 
enabled them to acquire tenders to undertake 
massive projects financed by the public. This has 
prevented these companies from performing the 
watchdog function expected from the media in 
established democracies. 
The economic crisis of 2000-2001 caused by the 
collapse of private banks resulted in a new wave of 
Since the establishment of the first newspaper in late 
Ottoman era, the media in Turkey has never been 
independent of the state.
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structural change in the media. This time, the entire 
sector was restructured with major changes in the 
ownership structure. The collapse of media conglom-
erates which owned some of these bankrupt banks led 
to their withdrawal from the sector and the transfer of 
their broadcasting companies to the state. The crisis 
had two major outcomes: the emergence of the state 
as a principal media owner and the establishment of 
high regulatory bodies. Newspapers, radios and 
televisions taken over by the state after the financial 
crisis were bought by companies which had no prior 
investment or experience in the media sector, but had 
close ties to the AK Party government. As a result of 
this reconfiguration of the mainstream media, the 
balance of power shifted in favour of the government 
and against the military which hitherto exercised 
ideological control over the media. Initially, the 
conflict between the government and the military was 
reflected in the media, which was sharply divided 
along pro-government and pro-military lines. The 
polarization in the media reached its peak in the run 
up to the presidential and general elections in 2007. 
With the launching of the Ergenekon cases against 
senior retired and on-duty military leaders accused of 
plotting a coup against the government, the re-elec-
tion of AK Party in the general elections, and the 
election of a president from an Islamist background 
radically changed media-government relations in 
Turkey. Mainstream media organs which had backed 
the military’s psychological warfare against AK Party 
drastically changed their positions; so much so that 
virtually all media has become pro-government.
The late 1990s and early 2000s also witnessed the 
initiation of the EU accession process, which served as 
the most recent and powerful trigger of structural 
change in the media sector. In order to align its legal 
framework with the EU’s acquis, Turkey had to 
undertake major reforms not only in laws and 
regulations concerning ownership of the media, but 
also those concerning content. In the meantime, the 
processes of globalization, the advancements in 
information technology, the growth of the Turkish 
economy and the prospect of stability offered by the 
EU candidacy not only rendered the media in Turkey 
an attractive sector for foreign investors, but also 
generated a need for further structural reform to cope 
with the rapidly changing technological developments 
in the sector. The outcome of these political, economic 
and social developments during the last three 
decades has been an extremely complex regulatory 
framework, which continues to be reshaped and 
redesigned, causing tremendous uncertainty for both 
the players and the wider public.
Eager to join the EU, Turkey also found itself having to 
undertake substantial reforms in the sphere of human 
rights and media freedom. Hundreds of ECtHR 
judgments waiting to be executed by the Turkish state 
provided the EU with an effective benchmark for 
measuring Turkey’s progress in fulfilling the political 
criteria for membership to the Union. Dozens of these 
judgments pertained to freedom of expression and 
freedom of the press. While the need for the complete 
overhaul of Turkey’s constitutional and legal frame-
work was evident, the change proved to be very 
difficult. Thanks to a series of constitutional amend-
ments and ‘reform packages,’ some progress was 
achieved towards the protection of human rights and 
press freedom. On the other hand, not only has 
progress been limited, but it has also been marked 
with regressions. While the AK Party government 
introduced significant human rights reforms in the 
early 2000s, it substantially rolled most of them back 
in later years, particularly after 2005. Turkey continues 
to have an extremely restrictive anti-terror law and its 
penal code retains authoritarian provisions in violation 
of fundamental rights and freedoms. The amorphous 
and over inclusive definition of terrorism and terrorist 
activity in the laws has caused hundreds of human 
rights activists, journalists and politicians to be 
prosecuted on remand for lawful political activities. 
The outcome of developments during the last three decades 
has been an extremely complex regulatory framework, 
which continues to be reshaped and redesigned.
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While there is a formal commitment to freedom of 
expression, freedom of the press and freedom of 
information in Turkey’s laws, what lies beyond this 
seemingly liberal facade is a framework where 
nationalism, statism and cultural conservatism are 
the supreme values looming over individual rights. 
The constitution and the laws governing the media are 
written with an authoritarian, paternalistic and 
conservative spirit, making the exercise of freedom of 
expression and media freedom prohibitively difficult 
due to expansive restrictions. The marginal space left 
in laws for the exercise of these freedoms is restricted 
further with media regulatory agencies, which are 
equipped with extensive sanctioning powers. The 
principal role designed for these agencies in Turkey is 
not policy making for the media but rather policing, 
which they successfully perform.
In an environment where the media is dominated by 
corporations driven with profit maximization and 
which therefore refrain from building adversarial 
relations with the state, the emergence and survival 
of an independent media proves difficult. The 
existence of an authoritarian legal framework which 
penalizes critical media coverage of sensitive political 
issues accentuates this challenge. The handful 
independent media organs which try to provide the 
public access to truth face significant financial 
difficulties and are harassed by criminal prosecutions. 
Virtually all journalists, of the mainstream and 
dissident media alike, work under extremely harsh 
conditions of very low wages, lack of social security, 
long work hours and lack of job security. Journalists 
who dared to join labour unions have faced and 
continue to face pressure, harassment and threats 
from their employers and often have to choose 
between their rights and their jobs. It cannot be 
denied that the vulnerable position of the journalists 
in face of the media owners or the political power is at 
the same time the result of the lack of horizontal 
solidarity among the journalists. The competition 
among the workforce and the fear of unemployment 
prevent journalists from voicing their problems even 
through the media. 
As a result, the prospects for media independence and 
freedom in Turkey appear extremely weak. In a sector 
driven by corporate interests, nepotism, clientelist 
relations, the media owners do not have the incentive 
to provide truthful and critical news coverage. The 
historical weakness of trade unions in Turkey, the high 
level of unemployment among journalists, the high 
turnover rate in the sector and the deep divisions 
among journalists due to ideological differences make 
it very difficult for media employees to engage in a 
unified struggle against their employers. The lack of a 
strong pro-democracy social movement, the ideologi-
cal conservatism of the judiciary, the institutional 
weakness of the parliament and the lack of democracy 
within political parties render the government –and 
future governments– too powerful vis-à-vis the 
society and the media. On a positive note, however, 
there is a growing awareness on the need for social 
monitoring of the media. The inability and the 
unwillingness of the media to regulate itself, as well 
as the authoritarian and punitive nature of state 
regulation, has mobilized the civil society to monitor 
the media’s compliance with universal principles and 
professional ethical codes and to combat discrimina-
tion and hate speech in the media. 
While Turkey has undergone significant political 
reforms in the past decade and will continue to do so, 
change will not be quick or easy. What awaits the 
society in general and the media in particular is a long 
struggle, where real change will only be possible with 
an overhaul of institutions and a radical change in 
mindsets.    
In a sector driven by corporate interests, nepotism, clientelist 
relations, the media owners do not have the incentive to 
provide truthful and critical news coverage.
The handful independent media organs which try to 
provide the public access to truth face significant financial 
difficulties and are harassed by criminal prosecutions.
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Annex 1. List of Interviews Conducted 
as Part of This Research Project
Interview with Sancak Basa, Human Resources 
Director of daily Hürriyet, by Ceren Sözeri, Istanbul, 
08/12/2010
Interview with Uğur Şeker, General Manager of 
interactive advertising agency Dijital Büro İstanbul, 
and founding member of IAB Türkiye, by Ceren Sözeri, 
Istanbul, 02/02/2011
Interview with Ayşe Sözeri Cemal, member of Press 
Watch and Research Committee and Advertising 
Group Director of daily Hürriyet, by Ceren Sözeri and 
Zeynep Güney, Istanbul, 15/12/2010
Interview with Ferhat Boratav, News Editor of CNN 
Turk TV station, by Ceren Sözeri, Ebru İlhan, Istanbul, 
02/11/2010
Interview with Markar Esayan, Vice Chief Editor of 
daily Taraf, by Ceren Sözeri, Istanbul, 12/07/2011
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tives on the topic of ‘The New Legislation on the 
Structure and Authority of the Radio and Television 
Supreme Council’, Istanbul, 11/03/2011 
Minutes of the discussion groups convened with 
convened with policymakers, bureaucrats, media 
owners and high level executives of the media sector 
on the topic of ‘Investment and Competition Rela-
tions in the Media Sector: The Present and the Future 
of the Sector’, Istanbul, 21/04/2011 
Minutes of the discussion groups convened with 
policymakers, bureaucrats, journalists and experts on 
the topic of ‘Media and regulatory high bodies: The 
status of legal and governance regulations’ Ankara, 
18/10/2011
Annex 2. List of Discussion Groups 
Organized as Part of This Research 
Project
Minutes of the discussion groups convened with 
journalists and academicians on the topic of ‘Media 
and Democratisation’, Istanbul, 8/10/2010 
Minutes of the discussion groups convened with 
policymakers, bureaucrats, academics and represen-
tatives of professional media unions on the topic of 
‘Human Resources Problems and the Future of the 
Media Sector’, Ankara, 18/12/2010
Minutes of the discussion groups convened with 
journalists and journalist associations on the topic of 
‘Labour Relations and Working Conditions in the 
Media Sector’, Istanbul, 21/12 2010 
Minutes of the discussion groups convened with 
academics, policymakers and civil society representa-
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Annex 3. Which Media Group 
Owns Which Companies, 2012
Company Media Investments Other Investments
Doğan Grubu
Gazete: Hürriyet, Hürriyet Daily News, Radikal, Posta, Fanatik, 
TME Gazeteleri (Iz Ruk v Ruki, Expressz, Oglasnik)
TV: Kanal D, Turner’la ortak kanallar (TNT, CNNTürk, Catroon 
Network),
İnteraktif Kanallar:(Fix TV,  Dijital TV Platformu: D-Smart, Doğan 
Teleshopping
Radyo: RadyoD, CNNTürk Radyo, Slow Türk, Radyo Moda
TV-Müzik Yapım: D Productions, Kanal D Home Video, DMC
Haber Ajansı: DHA
Dergi-Kitap Yayıncılığı: 
Doğan Burda Dergi, Doğan Egmont, Doğan Kitap
Internet:
hurriyet.com.tr  yenibiris.com.tr 
hurriyetemlak.com hurriyetoto.com 
arabam.com
anneyiz.biz
Hurriyetkiyasla.com
Tipeez.com
arakibulaki.com
hangisinegitsek.com
TME siteleri
ww.nekretnine.net
www.auti.hr
www.irr.ru
www.job.ru
www.expressz.hu
www.szuperallas.hu
www.mojedelo.com 
www.oglasnik.hr 
www.posao.hr  
Dijital Hizmetler:
Doğan Platform
Doğan Telekom
Smile ADSL
Birpa Müşteri Hizmetleri (Call Center)
Dağıtım Ve Perakendecilik:
YAYSAT (Doğan Dağıtım)
Dergi Pazarlama Planlama
D&R
Basım:
Doğan Printing Center (DPC), Doğan Ofset
Avrupa:
DMG International 
TME
Kanal D Romania 
Euro D 
Diğer Faaliyetler:
Doğan Dış Ticaret (Foreign Trade)
Doğan Factoring
Sosyal Faaliyetler
Aydın Doğan Vakfı
Enerji: Elektrik Yatırımları (Boyabat Elektrik 
Üretim ve Ticaret Limited Şirketi, Doğan 
Enerji)
Sanayi: Çelik Halat, Ditaş (Otomotiv Yan 
Sanayi), Doğan Organik Ürünler
Ticaret:  Milpa
Finans: DD Konut Finansmanı, 
Turizm: Milta
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Doğuş Grubu
Televizyon:   NTV,  Star TV,  CNBC-E, NTV SPOR, Kral TV, e2
Yeni Medya: NTVMSNBC, NTVSPOR.net, Oley.com, Footbo.com, 
Enmoda.com
Radyo: NTV Radyo, Kral FM, Virgin Radyo, NTV SPOR Radyo, Radyo 
Voyage, Radyo Eksen,  Capital Radio
Dergi: Vogue, National Geographic, National Geographic Kids, Robb 
Report, CNBC-e Business, Motor Boat & Yatching, GQ
NTV Yayınları: NTV Tarih
Bankacılık ve Finans: Garanti Bankası, 
Garantibank International N.V., Garanti Bank 
SA, Garantibank Moscow, Garanti Yatırım, 
Garanti Portföy, Garanti Leasing, Garanti Filo 
Yönetim Hizmetleri A.Ş., Garanti Factoring, 
Garanti Emeklilik ve Hayat, Garanti Ödeme 
Sistemleri, Garanti Mortgage, Garanti Filo 
Yönetim Hizmetleri A.Ş Garanti Teknoloji
Otomotiv: Doğuş Otomotiv (Volkswagen 
Binek Araç, Volkswagen Ticari Araç, Audi, 
Porsche, Bentley, Lamborghini, Bugatti, SEAT, 
Skoda, Scania, Krone ve Meiller),  İştirakler ve 
Kuruluşlar ( Doğuş Oto, DOD, D-Auto Suisse, 
Yüce Auto, Oto-Fix, vdf Grubu, TUVTÜRK ve 
LeasePlan), Lojistik Hizmetler,  Üretim ( 
Meiller Doğuş Damper Fabrikası,  Krone 
Doğuş Treyler Fabrikası)
İnşaat: Doğuş İnşaat, Teknik Mühendislik ve 
Müşavirlik A.Ş., Ayson Sondaj ve Araştırma
Turizm ve Hizmetler: Doğuş Turizm Grubu ( 
D-Hotel Maris, Maritim Hotel Club Alantur, 
Maritim Hotel Grand Azur, Grand Hyatt 
İstanbul ve Park Hyatt İstanbul - Maçka Palas, 
Arena Giyim), 
D-Marin Marinalar Grubu, D-Gym, D-Life
Gayrımenkul: Doğuş GYO, Doğuş Gayrımenkul, 
Enerji: Boyabat Elektrik Üretim ve Ticaret Ltd. 
Şti., Doğuş Enerji Üretim ve Tic. A.Ş. (Artvin 
HES), Aslancık Elektrik Üretim ve Ticaret Ltd. 
Şti., D-Tes Elektrik Enerjisi Toptan Satış A.Ş.
Çalık Holding
Gazete: Turkuvaz Medya Grubu (Sabah, Sabah Avrupa, Yeni Asır, 
Takvim, Fotomaç, 
Dergi: Turkuvaz Dergi Yayıncılık
TV: ATV, ATV Avrupa
Radyo: Turkuvaz Televizyon ve Radyo İşletmeciliği Sanayi ve 
Ticaret A.Ş (Radyo Turkuvaz, Radyo Romantik)
Dağıtım: Turkuvaz Dağıtım Pazarlama A.Ş.
Kitap Yayıncılık: Turkuvaz Kitapçılık Yayıncılık Sanayi ve Ticaret 
A.Ş., Turkuvaz Matbaacılık Yayıncılık Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.
Prodüksiyon: Turkuvaz Prodüksiyon ve Tanıtım A.Ş.
Haber Ajansı: Turkuvaz Haber Ajansı 
Dijital Medya ve Mobil Hizmetler: Turkuvaz Medya Digital, 
Turkuvaz Mobil Hizmetler
Tekstil: Gap Güneydoğu Tekstil, Türkmenbaşı 
Tekstil Kompleksi, Türkmenbaşı Jeans 
Kompleksi, Balkan Dokuma, Serdar Pamuk 
Eğrici, Serdar Altın Asır Tekstil Kompleksi, 
Çalık Alexandria
Enerji: Çalık Enerji,  Bursagaz, Kayserigaz, 
Naturelgaz
İnşaat: Gap İnşaat
Finans: Aktif Bank, Banka Kombetare 
Tregtare (BKT)
Telekomünikasyon: Alb Telecom
Ciner Grubu
Ciner Yayın Holding:
Gazete Habertürk, Ciner Medya Yatırımları, Ciner Gazete Dergi 
(dergi yayıncılığı), Habertürk Gazetecilik ve Matbaacılık, C Yapım 
Filmcilik, GD Gazete Dergi (dergi yayıncılığı)
 TV: Habertürk , Bloomberg HT
Radyo:  Habertürk Radyo, Bloomberg HT Radyo
Enerji ve Madencilik: Park Termik, Park Teknik, 
Eti Soda, Park Enerji, Park Elektrik, Silopi 
Elektrik Üretim, Park Toptan Elektrik Enerjisi 
Satış, Park Maden, Riotur
Ticaret, Sanayi ve Hizmet: Park Holding, ETİ 
Hava Taşımacılığı A.Ş., Park Tıp Sağlık, Havaş, 
Larespark Hotel, Park Denizcilik, Denmar, 
Park Sigorta, Park Cam, Ciner Denizcilik, Ciner 
Gemi, Lares Turizm
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Çukurova Grubu
Gazete: Akşam, Güneş 
Dergi: Alem, Stuff, Platin, FourFourTwo, Autocar  (Turkmedya 
gazete ve dergileri bünyesinde bulunduran şirket)
Digital Platform: DIGITURK
TV: Show TV, Show Max, Show Turk, Show Plus, Sky Turk360, Lig TV, 
Spor Max, Türk Max
Radyo: Alem FM, Lig Radyo
Yapım: Eksen
Medya Pazarlama: Zedpaş, Mepaş
Enerji: Genel Enerji, Taq Taq Operating 
Company
Telekomünikasyon: TURKCELL, Kuzey Kıbrıs 
TURKCELL, Turkcell Teknoloji,  Geocell, Kcell, 
Azercell, Moldcell, Life, Global Bilgi, Global 
Tower, Superonline, Tellcom, KVK, Inta 
Spaceturk, Millenicom, KVK Teknik Servis, 
TURKCELL Teknoloji, European 
Telecommunication Holding E.T.H AG, Atel, 
Topaz, Inteltek, Turkkule, Hobim, Bilyoner.
com, Life, Moldcell
Taşımacılık ve Hizmet: Geden Lines, Baytur 
Trading S.A., Baytur S.A., Anadolu 
Uluslararası Ticaret ve Taşımacılık A.Ş, Inter 
Depo, Pamuk Spor, Çukurova Havacılık A.Ş. 
Endüstri: BMC, Çukurova İthalat ve İhracat 
Türk A.Ş., Çukurova Makine İmalat ve Ticaret 
A.Ş., Çukurova İnşaat Makineleri Sanayi ve 
Ticaret A.Ş. (Çimsataş),  Çukurova Mümesillik 
Müşavirlik, Çukurova Ziraat, Çukurova 
Powergeneration,  Çukurova Kimya,   
Çukurova Sanayi İşletmeleri T.A.Ş., Daussan 
Çukurova Kimya A.Ş, Kamplamin Ambalaj San. 
Ve Tic. A.Ş, Noksel, Noksel Espana, Maysan 
Mando, Selkasan, SCA Packaging, OVA SCA 
Packaging, Atkasan
Finans:  Banque de Commerce et de 
Placements (BCP)
İnşaat: Baytur
Feza Gazetecilik
Gazete: Zaman, Today’s Zaman, Zaman Azerbaycan, Zaman 
Kazakistan, Zaman Avusturya, Zaman Avrupa Zaman Bulgaristan, 
Zaman Romanya, Zaman Türkmenistan, Zaman Amerika
Dergi: Aksiyon, Sızıntı, Gonca
TV: STV, STV Avrupa, STV Amerika, S Haber, Mehtap TV, Ebru TV, 
Yumurcak TV, Küre TV, Hazar TV, Dünya TV
Haber Ajansı: Cihan
Radyo: Burç FM, Dünya Radyo, Samanyolu Haber, 
Kitap Yayıncılığı: Zaman Kitap
Albayrak Grubu
Gazete: Yeni Şafak
TV: TVNET
İnternet: Yenişafak.com.tr
İnşaat: Albayrak GYO, Albayrak İnşaat
Sanayi: Tümosan Traktör ve Motof Fabrikası, 
Ereğli Entegre Tekstil Fabrikası
Lojistik: Trabzon Limanı, Albayrak Araç 
Kiralama, Albayrak Personel Taşımacılığı
Hizmet: Al-Bil Bilgi İşlem, Atık Yönetimi 
(Yeşil Adamlar), Sayaç Okuma
Turizm: Albayrak Turizm
Koza İpek Gazete: Bugün
TV: Kanaltürk, Bugün TV
Radyo: Kanaltürk Radyo
Matbaa: Koza Davetiye
Maden: Koza Altın İşletmeleri A.Ş (Ovacık 
Altın Madeni, Mastra Altın Madeni)
Fox Grubu Televizyon: Fox TV, Fox life, FX, National Geographic Channel, Baby TV,İnternet: Myspace.com
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İhlas Grubu
Gazete: Türkiye 
TV: TGRT Haber, TGRT Haber TV EU, TGRT Belgesel
Haber Ajansı: İHA
Reklam: İhlas Reklam Ajansı
Medya Pazarlama: TGRT Pazarlama
Dergi Grubu
İnternet: İhlas.net
İnşaat: İhlas İnşaat Grubu
Üretim: İhlas Ev Aletleri, Bisan, Kristal Kola
Sağlık veTurizm: Türkiye Gazetesi Hastanesi, 
İhlas Armutlu Tatil Köyü, Kuzuluk Tatil Köyü, 
Kuzuluk Termal Otel
Eğitim: İhlas Koleji
Madencilik: İhlas Madencilik A.Ş
Hayat Görsel 
Yayıncılık A.Ş
TV: Kanal 7, Kanal 7 Avrupa, Ülke TV
Radyo: Radyo 7
Internet: Haber7.com, Haber7Emlak
Pazarlama: Mepa Medya A.Ş
Beyaz Şirketler Grubu
Eğitim:  İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi Sanat 
ve Meslek Eğitimi Kursları (İSMEK), İzmir 
Büyükşehir Belediyesi Meslek Edindirme 
Kursları (İZMEB), Bursa Büyükşehir 
Belediyesi Sanat ve Meslek Eğitimi Kursları 
(BUSMEK), Odunpazarı Belediyesi Meslek 
Edindirme Kursları (OMEK)  ve  Beyoğlu 
Belediyesi Semt Konakları
Yayıncılık: Beyaz İletişim A.Ş ve Nokta 
Elektrik Medya Ltd. Şti.
Demirören Grubu Gazete: Milliyet, Vatan 
Demirören Şirketler Grubu:
Gaz Grubu: Milangaz, Likidgaz, Mutfakgaz, 
Güneşgaz
Sanayi Grubu: Demirören Tüp A.Ş, Azerbaycan 
Ağır Sanayi, Parsat Piston A.Ş
İnşaat Grubu: Demirören İnşaat
Eğitim Grubu: Ata Koleji
Dünya Grubu
Gazete: Dünya gazetesi
Basım: Dünya Süper Web Ofset A.Ş Dünya Yayıncılık A.Ş., Dünya 
Aktüel A.Ş., 
Dağıtım: Dünya Süper Dağıtım
E-Dünya: kobiden.com, dunyastore.com, pcworld.com.tr, 
computerworld.com.tr, byte.com.tr, dunyagida.com.tr, dunyainsaat.
com.tr, makinamagazin.com
TMSF Olay TV, Olay FM Kamu
MNG Holding TV: TV8
İnşaat: Günal İnşaat, Ticaret ve Sanayi A.Ş., 
MAPA İnşaat ve Ticaret A.Ş., MNG ESMAŞ 
A.Ş., MNG Tesisat A.Ş., MNG Targem A.Ş., 
MNG Zemtaş A.Ş.
Turizm: MNG Turizm
Taşımacılık: MNG Havayolları ve Taşımacılık 
A.Ş., MNG Kargo
Finans: MNF Factoring, MNG Finansal 
Kiralama
Uçak Bakım: MNG Technic
Enerji: Derya Elektrik Üretimi ve Ticaret A.Ş., 
BGT Mavi Enerji Elektrik Üretim Dağıtım 
Pazarlama Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.
Termikel KTV Yayıncılık: Kanal A, Radyo A Sanayi: Termikel A.Ş.
Mediasa (Sabancı) Fashion TV Türkiye, Fashion TV Magazine, Z TV Tekstil: Demsa Group, Harvey Nichols
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Spectrum Medya: Süper FM, Metro Fm, Joy Fm, Joy Türk FM
Actera Group (Özel Fon)
Mey İçki, G2M, LBT Varlık Yönetim, Mars 
Entertainment Group
Power Group Radyo:  Power FM, Power Türk, Power XL, Radyo Fenomen Giyim: Vakko, Vakkorama, V2K Designers, W Collection
Saran Group Radyo:  Radyo Spor, Radyo Tatlıses, Radyo Time ve Radyo PinkSeslendirme: Saran Digital Studios
Turizm: Cedok
Enerji: Saran Enerji
Savunma Sanayi: Saran Savunma ( Raytheon 
International, Bell Helicopter Textron, Israel 
Aircraft Industries, Astronautics)
Sağlık: Vita Family
Bir Numara 
Yayıncılık
TV:  Number One TV, Fashion One TV
Radyo:  Number 1 FM, Radyo Klas
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